Pro Choice for Lawyers in a Revised Pro Bono System
INTRODUCTION

Mandatory pro bono' could create a "recipe for malpractice" if lawyers fail to fulfill their obligation zealously. 2 While attorneys have traditionally objected to free legal service as a
mandatory duty,3 the United States Supreme Court declared, in
Gideon v. Wainwright,4 that individuals have a fundamental right to
I Literally translated, pro bono means "for the good." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990). See Joseph L. Torres & Mildred R. Stansky, In Support of a
Mandatory Public Service Obligation, 29 EMORY L.J. 997, 1006 (1980) (noting that the
Association of New York's Special Committee on the Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligation
found this traditional definition too broad to represent its views); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990) (defining pro bono as legal services that are "performed free of charge"). Under a typical pro bono program, lawyers are expected
to set aside a certain number of hours per year to represent clients who cannot
afford to retain a private attorney. Alan M. Slobodin, Pro Bono Should Be Free Choice,
NAT'L L.J., May 25, 1992, at 13. Pro bono service helps meet the substantial legal
needs of the ordinary person. See Honorable Joseph W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro
Bono Publico Legal Services: Mandatory or Voluntary? Distinction Without a Difference?, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 745-46 (stating that "the need and the call to duty are the engines
driving the intensified efforts for pro bono legal services reform"). Pro bono is
most frequently utilized as a means of meeting the legal needs of the poor. See
Suzanne Bretz, Why Mandatory Pro Bono is a Bad Idea, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 623,
625 (1990) (explaining that renewed interest in pro bono is driven by a "compelling need for legal representation of the poor and even the lower middle class");
Michael S. Greco & Cleaveland D. Miller, Time and/or Money: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to "Buy Out" of Their Pro Bono Obligation, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 950, 950
(1989) (positing that the real issue underlying the pro bono obligation is how to
best "meet the enormous unmet legal needs of the poor"); Dean S. Spencer,
Mandatory Public Service for Attorneys: A Proposalforthe Future, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 493,
494 (1981) (noting that the lack of indigent legal services is the "primary motivating factor" supporting pro bono); Cynthia R. Watkins, Note, In Support of a
Mandatory Pro Bono Rulefor New York State, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 177, 184 (1991) (noting that "[d]espite the public and private efforts, the needs of the poor for legal
services are still, to a large extent, unmet").
2 Slobodin, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting United States Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor from her speech at the American Bar Association's annual
meeting in August of 1991).
3 Steven Wechsler, Attorneys 'Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 909, 909 (1990). See also Howard A. Matalon, Note, The Civil Indigent's Last
Chancefor Meaningful Access to the Federal Courts: The Inherent Power to Mandate Pro Bono
Publico, 71 B.U. L. REV. 545, 571 (1991) (reporting that the American Bar Association's ethical regulations deem pro bono service voluntary, not compulsory).
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For discussions of Gideon see Marvin J. Anderson,
Gideon A Challenging Opportunity For School and Bar, 9 VILL. L. REV. 619, 627, 634
(1964) (asserting that Gideon provided both the bar and law students with an opportunity to meet the needs of indigents); WilliamJ. Hunsaker, Right to Counsel-Before
and After Gideon, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 78, 78, 83, 85 (1964) (examining the history of
the right to counsel pre-Gideon and its impact on post-Gideon decisions such as Mas-
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counsel. 5 Responding to this dilemma, many jurisdictions have
either considered or adopted a mandatory pro bono requirement. 6 New Jersey's private bar, for example, provides indigent
siah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois; Michael B. Mushlin, Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What Does The Right to Counsel Guarantee Today?, 10 PACE L. REv. 327,
329 (1990) (highlighting both the praise and criticism that the Gideon decision has
received since its inception); William W. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher
Penalties and the "Successful" CriminalAppellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 608 (1965) (asserting that retroactive application of Gideon may result in a more severe penalty for
criminals appealing convictions made without the benefit of counsel); Victoria R.
Kendrick, Comment, UncompensatedAppointments of Attorneys For Indigent Criminal Defense: The Need For Supreme Court Standards, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 389, 391 (1984) (addressing the need for Supreme Court standards regarding an attorney's right to
compensation in light of Gideon); Note, Effective Assistance of Counselfor the Indigent
Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434, 1434 (1965) (positing that Gideon has lead to
many frivolous claims of the denial of the right to counsel).
5 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 334. Following Gideon the Supreme Court maintained an
expansive view of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973) (establishing right to counsel at complex probation revocation hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (extending right to counsel for
misdemeanor offenses); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that juveniles
are entitled to counsel at delinquency hearings); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137
(1967) (mandating representation for combined revocation and sentencing hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (extending right to counsel to pre-indictment lineup).
In the civil context, case law suggests that the right to counsel could be implied
as a consequence of a citizen's rights to due process and access to the court system.
See AlanJ. Stein, Note, The Indigent's "Right" To Counsel In Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 989, 996 (1975) (asserting that Manness v. Meyers "has raised the question of
whether the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the [F]ifth
[A]mendment may mandate appointment of counsel in certain civil litigation").
For example, courts have often mandated that obstacles such as filing fees cannot
impede a litigant's access to the court system simply because that litigant cannot
meet the costs attending such aspects of the trial process. Id. For other cases implying a right to counsel in civil matters, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374
(1971) (holding that a state cannot deny access to the court system for a divorce
"solely because of the inability to pay" filing fees); Danforth v. State Dept. of
Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (mandating assignment of counsel
at hearing regarding revocation of parental rights). But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656, 660-61 (1973) (denying a right to waiver of filing fee in appellate review
of lower court's refusal to increase welfare payments); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 435, 450 (1973) (refusing to waive filing fee for bankruptcy).
6 See Bretz, supra note 1, at 632-38 (analyzing mandatory pro bono recommendations in various states since 1980). Among some of the states that have considered a mandatory pro bono program are Florida, Maryland, North Dakota and
Oregon. See id. In May 1992, New York delayed until 1993 the imposition of the
mandatory pro bono requirement that was proposed by the Marrero Committee in
1988. Gary Spencer, Decision Delayed a Year on Mandatory Pro Bono Rule, N.Y. L.J.,
May 22, 1992, at 1. See generally infra note 128 (explaining New York's proposed
mandatory pro bono requirement developed by a committee appointed by Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals). Jurisdictions that currently
impose some form of mandatory obligation include Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois,
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criminal representation under the assigned counsel system. 7
A mandatory pro bono system without compensation hinders the effectiveness of appointed representation. 8 Some attorneys are unfairly burdened 9 and some lack the experience to
Iowa and Texas. Deborah Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono The Shape of Things to Come?,
A.B.A.J. 62, 62 (Dec. 1987).
7 See Arnold S. Trebach, The Indigent Defendant, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 627,
634-39 (1957) (criticizing New Jersey's assigned counsel system for the timing of
assignments, waiver practices, definition of indigency, method of assignment and
attorney compensation); Arnold S. Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New Jersey,
12 RurGERs L. REV. 289, 290 (1957) [hereinafter Trebach, Modern Defender] (claiming that the assigned counsel system in New Jersey inadequately serves the poor
and fails to "assure that the ends ofjustice are always satisfied"); Final Report of the
Supreme Court Committee on Court Appointments of Fiduciaries, Counsel and Experts, 125
NJ. LJ. 856, 862 (Mar. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Committee Report on Court Appointments]
(reviewing court appointments and related procedural issues).
8 See Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 NJ. 591, 595, 601 A.2d 211, 213
(1992) (recognizing that representing indigent defendants without compensation
can be inefficient as well as unfair to defendants). Specifically, ChiefJustice Wilentz
of the New Jersey Supreme Court portrayed the state's system of assigning counsel
as "inefficient, historically unfair, and potentially unconstitutional." Id. at 596. The
New Jersey Supreme Court noted, however, that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is only the right to effective counsel, rather than to the best counsel. Id. at
599, 601 A.2d at 215 (citing United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1971)). Henry M. Hills, Note, Current Status of the
TraditionalDuty of the Attorney To Serve Without Compensation Upon Court Appointment, 93
W. VA. L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1991) (asserting that mandatory pro bono hinders the
constitutional right to counsel); Greg Stevens, Note, Forcing Attorneys to Represent
Indigent Civil Litigants: The Problems And Some Proposals, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 767,
775 (1985) (citing cases holding that forced representation interferes with effective
representation); see also State v. Rush, 46 NJ. 399, 405-06, 217 A.2d 441, 444
(1966) (stating that assigned counsel are no less qualified than privately retained
counsel).
9 Madden, 126 NJ. at 603-05, 601 A.2d at 217. See also Committee Report on Court
Appointments, supra note 7, at 862 (reviewing methods of court appointment employed in the New Jersey Superior and Municipal Courts). The Municipal Court
Subcommittee of the Supreme Court Committee on Court Appointments of Fiduciaries, Counsel and Experts conducted a survey of the 511 municipal courts in New
Jersey. See id. at 859 (reporting survey results). The subcommittee indicated that
municipal courts throughout the state utilized the following types of systems for
appointing counsel to represent indigents:
1) Random selection of an attorney present in the courtroom.
2) A paid public defender employed by the municipality or several
municipalities joining together for this purpose.
3) Rotation among a number of attorneys who submit their names to
the municipal court judge for representation of indigent defendants
for a fixed sum per case.
4) Selection on a rotating basis from a list of attorneys practicing
and/or living within the municipality or county.
5) Assignment from a list maintained by the Assignment Judge or
under his or her supervision in the office of the Trial Court Administrator, which list is frequently based upon those lawyers paying to the
Clients Security Fund who reside in the vicinage.
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represent competently their clients.' 0 A mandatory pro bono
system must also overcome constitutional obstacles in the First,
Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments." Compounding the problem, the New Jersey Legislature has continuously failed to fund adequately the state's Public Defender
system. 12 Consequently, while the legal needs of the poor as well
as the cost of indigent representation increase,' 3 the private bar
is forced to bear the burden of a public expense. 1 4 Because a
mandatory pro bono requirement cannot completely satisfy the
legal needs of the poor,' 5 there should be indigent representation provided by public funding combined with voluntary
service
16
by members of the bar under a "mixed system."'
6) There are other hybrid variations of the above examples.
Id. at 862.
10 Id. at 607, 601 A.2d at 219. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (addressing the concern that a lawyer's lack of competence to handle the legal
problems of an assigned case that is not within the lawyer's area of expertise hinders representation).
I' See Hills, supra note 8, at 1007-13 (discussing constitutional concerns associated with pro bono); see also Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and
Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 386-96 (1981); Bruce A. Green,
Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal
Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 370-90 (1981).

12 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-I to -25 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (mandating
representation for indigents); Madden, 126 N.J. at 612, 601 A.2d at 221 (noting that
the New Jersey Legislature has failed to fund the Act authorizing the appointment
of counsel).
13 See Bretz, supra note 1, at 641 (arguing that mandatory pro bono "is not the
answer to the problem of the increasing unmet legal needs of the poor"); Robert S.
Hunter,Slave Labor In the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & COM. 3,8-9 (1969)
(discussing the high costs of operating a modern law practice and representing indigent litigants).
14 Madden, 126 N.J. at 594-95, 601 A.2d at 212-13; State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399,
414-15, 217 A.2d 441, 449 (1966).
15 Bretz, supra note 1, at 641 (acknowledging that without increased appropriations, services must be reduced or funds will be exhausted). Bretz noted that some
jurisdictions have attempted to implement pro bono programs that crumbled
under the enormous administrative tasks of coordinating, monitoring and enforcing the programs. Id. Bretz also saw the potentiality for ineffective representation.
Id. See also Stevens, supra note 8, at 793 (noting that uncompensated appointments
engendered unmotivated representation and disadvantaged the indigent client in
civil cases).
16 See Jay L. Lichtman, Structured Alternatives to Random Court Appointments, L. A.
DAILY J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 4 (positing that a mixed system "offers unity and efficiency" by fairly and promptly assigning representation and reducing investigative,
training and administrative costs and duties). A "mixed system" would more fairly
allocate the burden among the public sector and private bar and would offer the
indigent the most effective representation. Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7,
at 307 (advocating that New Jersey implement a mixed public-private defender system for indigent representation). See infra notes 230-74 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the alternatives to mandatory pro bono programs.
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This Comment will explain the pro bono obligation's background, which underscores the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Madden v. Township of Delran,17 the arguments for and
against a mandatory pro bono system and some alternative solutions. Part I explores the history of the right to counsel in the
criminal context in both England and the United States, and
briefly summarizes the civil indigent's right to an attorney. Part
II addresses New Jersey's legislative treatment of the right to
counsel, implementation of that right in the courts via the assigned counsel system and the attorney's right to compensation.
Part III examines the history of the pro bono obligation, and Part
IV discusses the NewJersey Supreme Court's examination of pro
bono in Madden. Part V focuses on the arguments for and against
the imposition of a mandatory pro bono requirement. Finally,
Part VI proposes alternative solutions to the funding problems of
an indigent representation system and offers methods for encouraging voluntary participation by the private bar.
I.

A.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Criminal Context

Although the right to trial dates back to the mid-thirteenth
century, traditional English common law was slow to recognize
the criminal defendant's right to retain counsel. 8 Prior to 1695,
the right to retain counsel was specifically withheld from those
charged with the serious crime of treason,' 9 while counsel, ironically, was afforded to those charged with misdemeanors."0 Pursuant to the Treason Act of 1695,2 1 England granted a defendant
17 126 N.J. 591, 601 A.2d 211 (1992). See infra notes 126-44 and accompanying
text (discussing Madden in detail).
18 WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8 (1955).
19 Id. at 9. English judges, however, permitted counsel to advise a defendant

accused of felony or treason on "the conduct of his case and to represent him in
collateral matters" and with regard to questions of law arising in trial. Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942) (citation omitted).
20 Id. Although misdemeanors, which included libel, perjury, battery and conspiracy, were not punished by incarceration, defendants were provided with counsel because the state's interest in the outcome was minimal. Id.
21 The Treason Act of 1695 stated in relevant part:
[P]ersons prosecuted for High Treason and Misprision of Treason,

whereby the Liberties, Lives, Honour, Estates, Blood and Posterity of
the Subjects, may be loft and destroyed, should be justly and equally
tried, and that Persons accused as Offenders therein should not be

debarred of all just and equal Means for Defence of their Innocencies
in such Cases; ... and that every such Person so accused and indicted,
arraigned or tried for any such Treason, as aforesaid, or for Mispri-
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were
accused of treason the right to counsel, but not until 1836 22
counsel.
retain
to
permitted
felonies
of
all persons accused
In 1903, the Poor Prisoner's Defence Act 2 3 authorized the
appointment of counsel in all felonies.2 4 Under this Act, a judge
appointed a solicitor 25 and a barrister2 6 to handle all criminal indictments if a defendant could not afford counsel or if justice so
required.2 7 The Poor Prisoner's Defence Act, however, provided
that to have counsel appointed, an indigent had to reveal his defense to the court in the presence of his adversary. 28 A defendsion of such Treason, from and after the said Time, shall be received and
admitted to make his and theirfull Defence by Counsel learned in the Law....
and in case any Person or Persons so accused or indicted shall desire Counsel, the
Court before whom such Person or Persons shall be tried, or some Judge of the
Court, shall and is hereby authorized and requiredimmediately, upon his or their
request, to assign to such Person and Persons such and so many Counsel ....
TREASON ACT OF 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
22 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 9, 12. Under the 1695 Act, the accused still did not
have a right to counsel for crimes punishable by death. Id. at 9. Although defendants accused of a felony had a right to counsel, it was not mandatory that counsel
appear on their behalf. Gail S. Guglietta, Comment, Mallard v. United States District Court: A Case for Volunteered Pro Bono Representation, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 923,
926-27 (1991).
23 POOR PRISONER'S DEFENCE ACT, 1903, 3 EDW. 7, ch. 38, § 1 (Eng.).
24 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 12-13; Guglietta, supra note 22, at 926-27. The Poor
Prisoner's Defence Act of 1903 provided:
If a defendant's means are insufficient to enable him to obtain legal
aid, and if it appears from the nature of the defence set up by him as
disclosed in the evidence given or statement made before the committingjustices that it is desirable in the interests ofjustice that he should
have legal aid, the committing justices upon the committal of the defendant for trial and the judge of a court of assize or a chairman of a
court of quarter sessions or a recorder at any time after reading the
depositions, may certify that the prisoner ought to have legal aid, and
thereupon the defendant is entitled to have a solicitor and counsel
assigned to him; if a solicitor is assigned, he instructs counsel and
procures any evidence required on the prisoner's behalf.
POOR PRISONER'S DEFENCE ACT, 1903, 3 EDW. 7, ch. 38, § 1 (Eng.).
25 Guglietta, supra note 22, at 927 n.26. A solicitor was responsible for writing
out the pleadings. Id. Additionally, a solicitor would appear on behalf of the litigant at the proceedings and could bind the defendant with his statements. Matalon,
supra note 3, at 567 n.138.
26 Guglietta, supra note 22, at 927 n. 26. A barrister was a "specially trained"
lawyer who conducted trials and argued in certain courts. David L. Shapiro, The
Enigma Of The Lawyer's Duty To Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 746 (1980). A barrister
was selected only on the basis of his oral advocacy skills, and a litigant could disclaim anything that the barrister said on the litigant's behalf. Matalon, supra note 3,
at 567 n.138.
27 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 12-13.
28 Id. The "committing justices" would only appoint counsel if the defendant
demonstrated "that it [was] desirable in the interests of justice that he should have
legal aid." POOR PRISONER'S DEFENCE ACT, 1903, 3 EDW. 7, ch. 38, § 1 (Eng.).
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ant's case could be prejudiced by the defendant's own
inexperienced disclosures and a judge's subsequent decision not
to appoint counsel. 29 To remedy this unfavorable situation, Parliament passed the Poor Prisoner's Defence Act of 1930,30 which
mandated assignment of counsel in all murder cases. 3 ' Subse29 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 13. Beaney warned that a defendant may not be able
to present his case as convincingly as an attorney. Id. Furthermore, Beaney noted
that "[i]n the average case the defendant was not given legal aid because English
judges felt assured of their personal ability to dispense justice." Id.
30 The Poor Prisoner's Defence Act of 1930 stated:
1. Defence of poor persons committed for trial.
(1) [any person committed for trial for an indictable offence
shall be entitled to free legal aid in the preparation and conduct of his
defence at the trial and to have solicitor and counsel assigned to him
for that purpose in the prescribed manner, if a certificate . . . is
granted in respect of him in accordance with the provisions of this
section.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, a defence certificate
may be granted in respect of any person
(a) by the committing justices, upon his being committed for
trial; or
(b) by the judge or chairman of the court before which he is to be
tried, at any time after reading the depositions, and such justices,
judge, or chairman are in this section referred to as 'the certifying
authority.'
(3) a defence certificate shall not be granted in respect of any
person unless it appears to the certifying authority that his means are
insufficient to enable him to obtain such aid, but where it so appears
to the certifying authority, that authority
(a) shall grant a defence certificate in respect of any person committed for trial upon a charge of murder; and
(b) may grant a defence certificate in respect of any person committed for trial upon any other charge if it appears to the certifying
authority, having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including
the nature of such defence, if any, as may have been set up), that it is
desirable in the interests ofjustice that he should have legal aid in the
preparation and conduct of his defence at the trial.
2. Legal aid before courts of summary jurisdiction. If it appears to a
court of summary jurisdiction or examining justices that the means of
any person charged before them with any offence are insufficient to
enable him to obtain legal aid and that by reason of the gravity of the
charge or of exceptional circumstances it is desirable in the interests
of justice that he should have free legal aid in the preparation and
conduct of his defence before them, the court or justice may grant in
respect of him a certificate ... and thereupon he shall be entitled to
such aid and to have a solicitor and (where he is charged with murder
and the justices think fit) counsel assigned to him for that purpose in
the prescribed manner.
PooR PRISONER's DEFENCE ACT, 1930, 20 & 21 GEO. 5, ch. 32, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
31 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 13. The appointment of counsel in all other felony
cases, however, remained within the discretion of the judge throughout the 1940s
and 1950s. Guglietta, supra note 22, at 927.
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quently, responding to pressures to improve the status of both
criminal and civil indigents, Parliament enacted the Legal Aid
and Advice Act to provide legal assistance in virtually every

case.

32

In the United States, the Sixth Amendment governs a criminal defendant's right to counsel.3 3 The American judiciary did
not seriously examine the right to counsel until the landmark
"Scottsboro Case" (Powell v. Alabama)34 in 1932. 3 1 In Powell, the
United States Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure to
provide defendants with a reasonable opportunity to prepare a
36
defense with the assistance of counsel violated due process.
supra note 18, at 13-14; Albert Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76
L.J. 371, 371 & n.l (1966). The only court in which counsel would not be
furnished was the magistrate's court, which dealt in criminal matters. Id. at 371.
The Act's most significant improvements were that it resolved questions of doubt
regarding the appointment of counsel in favor of the defendant, and it recognized
the right to counsel prior to arraignment. BEANEY, supra note 18, at 14.
33 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963). The Sixth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S.
CONST. amend VI. In Gideon, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental right applicable to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. See infra note 46-50 (discussing Gideon and its progeny). For an analysis of arguments using the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel to oppose mandatory pro bono, see infra notes 20609 and accompanying text.
34 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the defendants were charged and convicted of
rape. Id. at 49, 50. On appeal, petitioners claimed, among other things, that "they
were denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and
opportunity of preparation for fair trial." Id. at 50. The record revealed that
although the defendants had the assistance of counsel, it was not provided from the
time of arraignment to the beginning of trial, the most critical period of the proceedings. Id. at 57.
35 William M. Beaney, Comment, The Right to Counsel Past, Present, and Future, 49
VA. L. REV. 1150, 1151 (1963). See also J. Eric Smithburn & Theresa L. Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel In Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 498, 499 (1981) (discussing right to effective assistance
of counsel as a corollary of the right to counsel established in Powell v. Alabama and
recommending adoption of guidelines to establish the standard of review in ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Laurie S. Fulton, The Right To Counsel Clause Of The
Sixth Amendment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1605-06 (1989) (reviewing Powell in the
context of the historical development of the right to counsel).
36 Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. The Court reasoned that even an intelligent and educated man had little skill in the practice of law and therefore required the guidance
of counsel at all steps in the proceedings. Id. at 69. Specifically, in often quoted
language, the Court concluded:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by
32 BEANEY,

YALE
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Lower courts interpreting Powell, however, narrowly defined the
right to counsel and limited its application to capital cases.3 7
The Supreme Court later clarified the right to counsel in
Johnson v. Zerbst,3 ' holding that the Sixth Amendment entitled a
defendant to the assistance of counsel unless the defendant intelligently waived this right.3 9 Nonetheless, in Bets v. Brady,4" the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 ' did not require the states to furnish counsel
an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the
case.
Id. at 71.
37 Nancy C. Lenvin, Note, The Right to Counsel and the Neophyte Attorney, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 378, 380-81 (1970) (stating that historically "the vast majority of
courts have interpreted Powell very narrowly, grnnting post-conviction relief only
when petitioner could demonstrate that the trial had been reduced to a 'sham,' a
'farce,' or a 'mockery of justice' "). See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
286-87 (1936) (holding that a coerced confession resulted from a denial of due
process rather than from ineffective appointment of counsel made one day prior to
trial); Wilson v. Lanagan, 19 F. Supp. 870, 872-73 (1937), aff'd, 99 F.2d 544 (1938)
(holding that in a non-capital case, defendant only possessed the right to retain
counsel rather than have counsel appointed), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 634 (1938); Yung
v. Coleman, 5 F. Supp. 702, 703 (1934) (acknowledging prisoner's right to private
consultation with counsel but within sight of an officer or place where the prisoner
could not escape). But see Andrus v. McCauley, 21 F. Supp. 70, 73 (1936) (concluding that due process included the right to trial by jury and representation by counsel in felony cases).
38 304 U.S. 458 (1938). For a discussion on the problems courts have faced in
applying the Johnson standard for waivers of the constitutional right to counsel, see
William T. Pizzi, Waiver of Rights in the Interrogation Room: The Court's Dilemma, 23
CONN. L. REV. 229, 231 (1991). See also Fulton, supra note 35, at 1605 (reviewing
Johnson v. Zerbst's place in the historical development of the right to counsel).
39 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68. According to the Johnson majority, an intelligent
waiver must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and consider "the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at 464. In Johnson, the petitioner was
convicted for "possession and uttering of counterfeit money." Id. at 459. From the
time of his arrest until trial, a period of two months, the petitioner was unable to
employ counsel on his behalf. Id. at 460. Petitioner, unrepresented by counsel,
pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. Id. The trial judge sentenced the petitioner
to four and one-half years imprisonment. Id. Petitioner appealed under writ of
habeas corpus, claiming he was denied the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 458-59.
40 316 U.S. 455 (1942). For a discussion on the significance of Gideon v. Wainwright in light of Betts v. Brady, see Yale Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright A QuarterCentury Later, 10 PACE L. REV. 343, 347 (1990). See also Fulton, supra note 35, at
1605-06 (reviewing Betts v. Brady as a part of the historical development of the right
to counsel).
41 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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in every case. 42 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, asserted
that the right to counsel in non-capital cases only existed when
fairness required the appointment of counsel.43
Following Betts, the application of the Court's "fair trial" rule
allowed states to control criminal trials while protecting defendants from unfair procedures.4 4 The "fair trial" rule ultimately
failed to eliminate needless appointments of counsel, however,
because criminal trials often contained complexities warranting
counsel appointment. 45 To settle the controversy regarding a
defendant's federal constitutional right to counsel in state courts,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gideon v. Wainwright.4 6
Similar to the petitioner in Betts, the defendant in Gideon
sought release from his conviction by habeas corpus petition, alleging that the denial of his right to counsel violated the Four42 Betts, 316 U.S. at 471. In Betts, the defendant was indicted for robbery, a noncapital offense. Id. at 456. At his arraignment, the judge denied the defendant's
request for the assignment of counsel. Id. at 456-57. Defendant pleaded not guilty
and elected for a non-jury trial without waiving his right to counsel. Id. at 457. At
trial, the defendant examined his own witnesses, and testified to establish an alibi.
Id. Additionally, the defendant cross-examined the state's witnesses. Id. The judge
found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to eight year's imprisonment. Id.
The defendant appealed, filing a writ of habeas corpus and asserting that his right
to counsel was denied. Id.
43 Id. at 471-72. The Court concluded that while most states recognized that a
defendant cannot be denied the privilege of counsel, states are not compelled to
appoint an attorney. Id. at 468-71. The Court stated that the matter of appointing
counsel was purely statutory and an object of legislative policy. Id. at 467. Thus, the
Court opined, the appointment of counsel was not a fundamental right, essential to
a fair trial. Id. at 471. The Court reasoned that the defendant in Betts was not helpless and was completely capable of protecting his own interests at trial. Id. at 472.
Additionally, the Court noted that the defendant was familiar with the criminal procedures of the Maryland system because of a prior conviction in which he pleaded
guilty and served a sentence. Id. The Court's holding that counsel be assigned
when fairness required appointment became known as the "fair trial" rule. Beaney,
supra note 35, at 1152-53. The "fair trial" rule required that counsel be appointed
when the defendant's "personal characteristics . . . or the complexity of the charge
[would make] a 'fair trial' unlikely if he lacked the assistance of counsel." Id. at
1152. Additionally, if a trial without the assistance of counsel was " 'unfair' because
the defendant's interests were not protected .. . the conviction would be reversed."
Id.
44 Beaney, supra note 35, at 1152-53; see also id. at n.14. (citing cases in which the
Supreme Court applied the "fair trial" rule).
45 Id. at 1153. For example, almost every criminal trial has at least one difficult
question, and most defendants are not as capable of defending themselves in the
same manner as a trained attorney. Id. See also David J. Issenman, Note, Indigent
Petty Offenders Accorded Right to Appointed Counsel, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 214, 217 &
n.29 (1971) (stating that courts only pay "lip service" to this rule and usually find
"special circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel").
46 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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teenth Amendment.4 7 Overruling Betts, the Court asserted that
the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was a fundamental right applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.4" Thus, the Court had come full circle, returning
to the affirmation in Powell of an indigent criminal defendant's
right to counsel. 49 Gideon, however, left several questions unanswered, including whether misdemeanor cases required counsel,
the manner with which to provide counsel to indigents, how to
meet the growing demand for counsel on appeals and when the
defendant's right to counsel begins. 5 °
The Supreme Court resolved one of the questions left open
in Gideon and extended the right to counsel for defendants
charged with misdemeanors in Argersinger v. Hamlin.5 Contrary
47 Id. at 339. In Gideon, the defendant was charged with breaking and entering a
poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Id. at 336-37. Because the
offense was a non-capital felony, the trial court denied defendant's request for
counsel. Id. at 337. As did the defendant in Betts, Gideon conducted his own defense at trial, making opening statements, cross-examining witnesses and testifying
on his own behalf. Id. A jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to
five years imprisonment. Id.
48 Id. at 342. The Court reasoned that "ample precedent" existed to make the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to the states via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 341. Other guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, the Court maintained, had been made obligatory upon the states. Id. See,
e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (extending the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying
the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable search and seizure to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's protection
against taking of private property for public use without just compensation applied
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, the Court concluded that
the Betts Court incorrectly held that the right to counsel was not a fundamental
right and improperly disregarded "its own well-considered precedents." Gideon,
372 U.S. at 342, 343-44.
49 Beaney, supra note 35, at 1153.
50 Id. at 1157-58. See also Issenman, supra note 45, at 218 (noting that, at the
time of Gideon, the United States Supreme Court had not yet decided whether indigents charged with misdemeanors were entitled to counsel). Some commentators
contend that the Gideon holding was overdue in light of the Supreme Court's concern, in recent decades, with criminal justice issues. See, e.g., Beaney, supra note 35,
at 1154.
51 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972). In Argersinger the petitioner was convicted of "carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by up to six months imprisonment, a $1,000 fine or both." Id. at 26. Similar to the petitioners in Betts and Gideon,
the defendant requested relief by writ of habeas corpus. Id. The Florida Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel extended only to trials for "non-petty offenses
punishable by more than six months imprisonment." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236
So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970). The United States Supreme Court granted petitioner's
request for certiorari. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401 U.S. 908 (1971). Although the
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to Gideon, the Argersinger Court discussed the right to counsel in
terms of a right to a fair trial rather than in the context of a fundamental right.5 2 The Court concluded that a defendant could
not be convicted for a misdemeanor, petty or felony offense without representation by counsel unless
the defendant knowingly
53
and intelligently waived that right.
B.

The Civil Context

Unlike its criminal counterpart, the right to counsel in civil
54
cases remains unclear and has a limited historical background.
The informa pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,' 5 currently govArgersinger Court expressly granted the right to counsel in misdemeanor offenses,
the classification of crimes remained in the state's discretion. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at
37. The Court noted, however, that a partial solution to the classification of minor
offenses might be to take them out of the court system. Id. at 38 n.9. For a discussion of Argersinger's application in misdemeanor offenses, see Steven Duke, The Right
to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 601-02
(1975).
52 See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31, 32, 33; see also Stein, supra note 5, at 990 (asserting that this approach was less restrictive, and therefore readily applicable to civil
cases). The Argersinger Court reasoned that the right to counsel is a prerequisite to
the right to a fair trial even in prosecutions in which the accused is charged with a
petty offense. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 33. For a discussion on the right to counsel in
civil cases, see infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
53 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. The Court also pointed out that the constitutional
and legal questions involved in a case that involves a crime that carries a penalty of
imprisonment of sixth months or greater is often no less complex than a case in
which the accused may serve a brief sentence. Id. at 33. Specifically, the Court
noted that a defendant's decision to plead guilty without consulting counsel
presents a problem in both misdemeanor and felony cases because the defendant
may be unaware of the consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 34. Finally, the high
volume of misdemeanor cases, the Court maintained, warrants the assistance of
counsel to ensure speedy resolutions. Id.
54 See Shapiro, supra note 26, at 752 (stating that the federal statute allowing
courts to "request" an attorney for a litigant only dates back to 1892); Guglietta,
supra note 22, at 931 (noting the courts' varied treatment of civil indigent litigants
and their right to counsel since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in 1892). Before
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989), several other Supreme
Court decisions implicitly suggested that a right to counsel for indigent civil litigants existed. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (reviewing cases in which the
right to counsel in a civil context is implied).
55 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(e) (1988). The informapauperisstatute provided in pertinent part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay
such costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress. ...
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erns the civil indigent's access to federal court.5 6 Until recently,
§ 1915(d) caused considerable confusion for federal courts confronted with the issue of whether the statute's use of the term
"request" authorized a judge to mandate representation for a
57
civil indigent litigant.

Attempting to resolve this confusion, the Supreme Court, in
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court,58 held that § 1915(d) did not
authorize a federal court to mandate an unwilling attorney to
represent an indigent civil litigant.59 The Court posited that
§ 1915(d) was intended to appeal to a lawyer's ethical conscience
rather than impose a mandatory requirement. 60 Although it clarified the meaning of "request," the Mallard Court declined to resolve whether the federal courts had the inherent power to
require service to indigent civil litigants.6 '
II.

NEW JERSEY

A. Right To Counsel
Since colonial America, New Jersey has recognized a right to
counsel for indigent criminal defendants.6 2 Initially, New Jersey
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person
unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of
poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) & (d) (1988).
56 Matalon, supra note 3, at 548.
57 Id. at 549-50 & n.27. Matalon criticized the statute, stating that 90% of indigent complaints filed in the federal court system are dismissed as "frivolous," despite the lack of consensus on the statute's definition of the term. Id. at 548-49 &
n.22. See also Guglietta, supra note 22, at 924 (noting that the courts of appeals were
split on the interpretation of whether a court could request or require counsel to
represent civil indigents).
58 490 U.S. 296 (1989). The Volunteer Lawyers Project asked Mallard to represent three civil indigents in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 299. The indigents, "two current inmates and one former inmate," alleged that prison officials
had executed fraudulent disciplinary reports against them, physically abused them,
and identified them to informants. Id. Mallard objected to the request citing his
lack of his experience, offering instead to represent litigants in his area of expertise.
Id. Specifically, Mallard specialized in bankruptcy and securities law. Id. Mallard
asserted that taking the case would violate his ethical obligation to competently
litigate a case. Id. at 300.
59 Id. at 310. The Court, therefore, reversed the District Court's order to compel representation. Id.
60 Id. at 308. Section 1915(d), the Court reasoned, was intended to support a
court's request for indigent representation rather than authorize sanctions for an
attorney's refusal. Id.
61 See id. at 310.
62 Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 629. The New Jersey Legislature's
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followed the English rule 6 3 for the assignment of counsel to indigent defendants.'
In 1776, however, the New Jersey Constitution extended the right to counsel to all criminals 65 and, in 1795,
the state legislature codified the right,6 6 thereby requiring the assignment of counsel in all criminal indictments.6 7 This statute
significantly advanced the English rule and was the first of its
kind in the country. 6 Today, the Public Defender Act 69 contains
the statutory right to counsel for indigents.7 °
Similar to the United States Supreme Court decisions that
three revisions of the state constitution all included a right to counsel. Id. Specifically, the New Jersey Constitutions of 1844 and 1947 provided in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to... have the assistance of counsel in his defense." N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 8 (1844); N.J. CONST., art.
I, para. 10 (1947). See BEANEY, supra note 18, at 18-19, 20 (stating that most states,
including NewJersey, adopted a right to counsel in their early constitutions); see also
infra note 72 and accompanying text (citing New Jersey cases that recognized an
indigent criminal defendant's right to counsel).
63 Under the English rule, indigents charged with misdemeanors were provided
with counsel. BEANEY, supra note 18, at 8-9. In 1695, Parliament enacted the Treason Act, which provided for the appointment of counsel in cases of treason. Id. at 9.
The English rule, however, did not allow appointment of counsel in felonies until
1903 under the Poor Prisoner's Defence Act. Id. at 12-13. See also supra notes 18-32
and accompanying text (discussing right to counsel under the English Rule).
64 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 20.
65 See NJ. CONST. ART. XVI (1776). The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided in relevant part: "[AIll criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of
witnesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to." Id.
66 See Act of March 6, 1795, WILLIAM PATTERSON, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY 162 (1800). The statute provided in relevant portion: "The court before
whom any person shall be tried upon indictment, is hereby authorized and required
to assign to such person, if not of ability to procure counsel, such counsel, not
exceeding two, as he or she shall desire, to whom such counsel shall have free
access at all seasonable hours." Id.
67 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 20.
68 Id. (citing the statute as "a tremendous advance over English rule and procedure"); Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 629 (praising the statute as a
"significant legal landmark").
69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-1 (West 1985). Subsection (1) of The Public Defender Act provided:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this State to provide for the
realization of the constitutional guarantees of counsel in criminal
cases for indigent defendants by means of the system and program
established and authorized by this act to the end that no innocent person shall be convicted, and that the guilty, when convicted, shall be
convicted only after a fair trial according to the due process of the law.
Id.
70 Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 285 A.2d 216, 218 (1971); In re Antini,
53 N.J. 488, 492, 251 A.2d 291, 293 (1969); In re Spann Contempt, 183 N.J. Super.
62, 66, 443 A.2d 239, 242 (App. Div. 1982); Norton v. State, 167 N.J. Super. 212,
214, 400 A.2d 801, 802 (App. Div. 1979).
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recognized a right to counsel, 7 ' the New Jersey Supreme Court
also acknowledged the indigent's right to the assistance of an attorney.72 Notably, one year before Argersinger v. Hamlin, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt," established
that indigent defendants charged with disorderly persons or
other petty offenses in municipal courts were entitled to counsel. 7 ' The potential scope of the court's holding, however, would
require the state to furnish counsel to all petty offenders. 75 The
court declared, therefore, that an indigent defendant could not
be convicted of an offense that entailed imprisonment or other
consequence of magnitude unless represented by assigned counsel without cost. 76 The Rodriguez Court, however, did not de71 See supra notes 33-53 and accompanying text (outlining the recognition of a
defendant's right to counsel in the United States).
72 See State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 522, 170 A.2d 1, 3 (1961) (declaring that
appointment of counsel is a matter of "absolute right under state law"); State v.
Ballard, 15 N.J. Super. 417, 420, 83 A.2d 539, 541 (App. Div. 1951) (stating that
"right to counsel is a fundamental one"), aff'd, 9 N.J. 402, 88 A.2d 537 (1952);
State v. Davis, 92 N.J. Super. 289, 292, 223 A.2d 208, 210 (App. Div. 1966) (recognizing that right to counsel is "essential to a fair trial"); State v. Edge, 111 N.J.
Super. 182, 187, 268 A.2d 35, 38 (App. Div. 1970) (stating that "[t]he right to the
aid of counsel is not a mere formality, it is the essence of justice").
73 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971).
74 Id. at 294, 277 A.2d at 223. In Rodriguez, the defendant, Mrs. Rodriguez, was
charged with assault and battery in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-26. Id. at
284, 277 A.2d at 217. Rodriguez's crime was classified as a petty offense punishable
by not more than six months incarceration, a fine or both. Id. (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:169-4). Although the defendant asked to be appointed counsel on the
basis of indigency, her request was denied. Id. Rodriguez subsequently filed a complaint in superior court to delay prosecution of her municipal court proceeding
until she was assigned counsel. Id. Rodriguez's complaint was dismissed because
under municipal court policy counsel was not assigned to persons charged with
petty offenses. Id., 277 A.2d at 217-18. In the companion case to Rodriguez, State v.
Conley, the defendant, Mr. Conley, was charged with use of narcotics in violation of
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-8 and possession of narcotic paraphernalia in violation of
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-77.5. Id., 277 A.2d at 218. Both offenses were classified as
disorderly persons offenses punishable by six months imprisonment, a fine or both.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-4). Without the assistance of counsel, Conley
pleaded guilty to the first offense and was found guilty at trial on the second. Id. at
284-85, 277 A.2d at 218. Both parties appealed their convictions, asserting that
they were denied assistance of counsel. Id.
75 Issenman, supra note 45, at 215. Specifically, Issenman posited that a right to
counsel for all municipal court indigents might require the state to provide counsel
to even those charged with the most minor of offenses, such as the "hypothetical
indigent 'who has parked too near a fireplug.' " Id.
76 Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d at 233. The court noted:
The practicalities may necessitate the omission of a universal rule for
the assignment of counsel to all indigent defendants and such omission may be tolerable in the multitude of petty municipal court cases
which do not result in actual imprisonment or in other serious consequence ....
But, as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant
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termine whether counsel should be compensated
services. 7 7

for their

should be subjected to a conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or
other consequence of magnitude without first having due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.
Id. The administrative director of the courts provided all assignment and municipal
court judges with a memorandum regarding the assignment of counsel in municipal
courts:
'[W]henever the particular nature of the charge is such that imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude is actually threatened
or is a likelihood on conviction, the indigent defendant should have
counsel assigned to him unless he chooses to proceed PRO SE with his
plea of guilty or his defense at trial.' Note also that (a) 'the substantial
loss of driving privileges' is considered to be a consequence requiring
the assignment of counsel; (b) that counsel is to be assigned without
cost to the indigent defendant; and (c) if a trial proceeds without
counsel and it subsequently appears that counsel should have been
assigned, 'the defendant should be given the option of starting anew
with suitable safeguards including, where necessary, trial before a
substituted municipal judge.'
2. It is imperative that this decision be implemented immediately. To this end each Assignment Judge, in conjunction with Municipal Judges in his county or counties, should establish a list or panel of
attorneys for each Municipal Court from which list the Municipal
Court judges shall then make assignments of counsel as required by
this decision. Until such lists or panels are prepared, it will be essential for each Municipal Court judge to assign counsel on an AD HOC
basis ....
3. Each Municipal Court judge should immediately establish an
appropriate screening procedure to ascertain in advance of trial: (a)
whether the charge made in the complaint is likely to result, in the
event of conviction, in imprisonment or other consequence of magniture [sic]; and (b) whether the defendant is indigent. In determining
indigency the court should consider the fee ordinarily charged by attorneys to handle such cases. It might be noted here that there is no
provision, either in this opinion, the court rules, or the statutes, which
presently authorizes a court to compensate assigned counsel in these
cases.
4. Since this decision will result in an increase in the number of
Municipal Court cases in which the defendant is represented by counsel, it becomes even more important that a prosecuting attorney be
available to represent the State or the municipality, as the case may
be. In those municipalities where a Municipal Court prosecutor is not
now available, it is recommended that the Assignment Judge and the
Municipal Court judge advise the governing body of the increased
need therefor.
5. Municipal Court judges encountering any special problems
in implementing this decision are requested to notify their Assignment Judge and the Administrative Office.
EDWARD B. MCCONNEL, MEMORANDUM TO ALL ASSIGNMENT JUDGES AND MUNICIPAL
COURT JUDGES, reprinted in Supreme Court Establishes Right to Assigned Counsel in Petty
Offenses, 94 N.J. L.J. 421,441 (May 20, 1971) (quoting Rodriguez, 58 N.J. at 295, 277
A.2d at 233).
77 Issenmann, supra note 45, at 229-30; see also John H. Bailey, Should Pro Bono Be
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In response to statutory provisions affording counsel for indigents, in 1948 the New Jersey judiciary codified the right to
counsel in Revised Court Rule 2:12-1.78 In 1952, Revised Rule
1:12-97' replaced Rule 2:12-1 and significantly expanded an indiMandatory? No: The Constitutional Rights of Clients and Lawyers Are At Stake, 129 N.J. L.J.
1187 (Dec. 23, 1991) (stating that Rodriguez single-handedly triggered a "draft of
pro bono attorneys").
78 See State v. Donaldson, 36 N.J. 45, 48-49, 174 A.2d 896, 898 (1961) (stating
that court rules that provided for the assignment and compensation of counsel
were established in 1948).
Revised Rule 2:12-1 reads in pertinent part:
(a) If the defendant appears in court, without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him
at the trial unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to
obtain counsel.
N.J. CT. R. 2:12-1(a) (Gann 1948).
79 Revised Rule 1:12-9 provided:
(a) Where a person charged with crime appears in any court
without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and
assign counsel to represent him at the trial unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
(b) Where an indigent person convicted of a crime desires to
take an appeal, or to institute proceedings to correct an illegal sentence or for a writ of habeas corpus, counsel who represented him in
the trial may with his consent, and if they are of the opinion that such
action is justified, take an appeal or institute proceedings upon his
behalf.
(c) Where the indigent person was represented by an attorney at
a criminal trial, or in any proceeding before a trial judge to correct an
illegal sentence or obtain a writ of habeas corpus, and the attorney is
of the opinion that an appeal is justified, he may, with the consent of
the indigent person, join with any counsellor-at-law of this State in
prosecuting an appeal upon behalf of the indigent person.
(d) Where an indigent person convicted of crime desires to take
an appeal, or to institute proceedings to correct an illegal sentence or
for a writ of habeas corpus, the trial court or the appellate court on his
application and on a showing of reasonable doubt may assign an attorney or counsellor-at-law, as may be appropriate, to represent him.
Assignments for these purposes and for the purpose of having preliminary reviews made to determine the existence of reasonable doubt
may be made from Habeas Corpus Advisory Committees organized
by the Junior Section of the State Bar Association.
(e) As far as practicable all assignments of attorneys or counsellors-at-law shall be made from the members of the county bar in alphabetical rotation from a master list to be maintained by the senior
county judge, except in cases of murder and assignments made under
paragraph (d) hereof. Law clerks and law students residing in the
county shall be assigned to them, wherever possible, to act as clerks in
the investigation and preparation of assigned matters. Counsel serving under paragraph (d) hereof shall be given credit for such service
on the master list. In cases of murder counsel shall be assigned by the
court specially and shall be allowed reasonable compensation.
(f) Counsel serving by assignment of court and under Rule 4:97-
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gent's right to counsel. s0 Today, Rule 3:27 governs the assignment of counsel to indigent defendants charged with an
indictable or non-indictable offense."' In addition, after the
United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault,82 the New
10 on matrimonial matters or serving under Rule 1:16-4(f) shall be
given credit for such service on the master list.
N.J. CT. R. 1:12-9(a)-(f) (Soney & Sage 1953).
80 State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 523-24, 170 A.2d 1, 4 (1961). Another court
rule, Revised Rule 8:3-3, expanded an indigent's right to counsel by requiring a
magistrate to inform a defendant of the right to counsel, and to have counsel appointed if the defendant was indigent. In re Garofone, 80 N.J. Super. 259, 276, 193
A.2d 398, 408 (1963). Similarly, Revised Rule 3:2-3(b) (Gann 1953) addressed an
indigent's right to counsel during preliminary hearings. Id.
81 N.J. CT. R. 3:27-1 to -2 (Pressler 1991). Rule 3:27 provided in pertinent part:
3:27-1. Indictable Offenses
Every person charged with an indictable offense shall be advised by
the court of his right to retain counsel and to have the Office of the
Public Defender represent him if he is indigent....
3:27-2. Non-Indictable Offenses
Every person charged with a non-indictable offense shall be advised
by the court of his right to retain counsel or, if indigent and constitutionally or otherwise entitled by law to counsel, of his right to have
counsel assigned without cost ....
If the court is satisfied that he is
indigent and that he is constitutionally or otherwise entitled by law to
counsel, the court shall assign counsel to represent him. Such assignment shall, so far as practicable, be made either in rotationfrom a list of available counsel established and made either in rotation from a list of available
counsel established and maintainedat the direction of the Assignment Judge or
under such other system as shall have been established by the Assignment Judge
with the approval of the Supreme Court.
NJ. CT. R. 3:27-1 to -2 (Pressler 1991) (emphasis added).
82 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In In re Gault, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a
juvenile charged with an offense that could result in institutionalization had a right
to counsel and, if unable to afford counsel, had a right to have counsel appointed.
Id. at 41. On June 8, 1964, Gerald Gault, a 15-year old minor, was arrested and
charged with making a lewd phone call to his neighbor. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. At the time,
Gerald was on probation for assisting another boy in stealing a wallet from a woman's purse. Id. at 4. Following a hearing on June 15, the superior court judge
committed Gerald to a state industrial school for six years. See id. at 7. The penalty
imposed upon an adult charged with a similar crime was a fine of $5.00 to $50.00 or
imprisonment not to exceed more than two months. Id. at 8-9. The Arizona
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the lower court's denial of Gault's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 10. The court reasoned that because a parent or
probation officer could protect the infant's interests, a juvenile court did not have a
duty to provide legal representation in a juvenile proceeding. Id. at 35. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, petitioner Gault requested a declaration that
the Juvenile Code of Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-201 to -239, was invalid on
its face, claiming that:
[B]ecause, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and
committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the
Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following basic rights are denied: ... [the] [r]ight to counsel.
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Jersey Supreme Court amended the Court Rules to also provide
counsel to juveniles whose delinquency might result in
institutionalization. 3
B.

New Jersey Assigned Counsel System

In general, the assigned counsel system remains the most
common method of providing counsel to indigents.84 Under an
assigned counsel system, judges or magistrates distribute the
burden of representation on a case-by-case basis to individual
Id. at 10.
Reversing the lower court's holding that a juvenile did not have a right to
counsel, the Supreme Court reasoned that a probation officer cannot adequately
represent a child's interests because many times an officer is required to testify
against the juvenile. Id. at 35-36. A juvenile, the Court opined, "needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts,
to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it." Id. at 36.
83 See In re Antini, 53 N.J. 488, 493, 251 A.2d 291, 294 (1969); see also N.J. CT. R.
5:20-2(a)-(c) (Pressler 1992) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-89 (West 1987) (governing a juvenile delinquent's right to counsel). Court Rule 5:20-2(a) provided in
pertinent part:
(a) Issuance. If it appears from the complaint that there is probable
cause to believe that a juvenile is delinquent and after review of the
complaint by the court intake service it recommends court action, a
summons shall issue to the juvenile and his parents, guardians or
custodian.
(b) Form. The summons . .. shall advise that the juvenile and his or
her parents, guardian, or custodian have the right to be represented
by counsel at every stage of the proceeding and that if unable to afford counsel, upon application to the court, counsel will be assigned if
in the opinion of the court the proceedings may result in the institutional commitment of the juvenile or other consequences of magnitude ....
N.J. CT. R. 5:20-2(a)-(b) (Pressler 1992). Section 2A:4A-89 stated in pertinent part:
When intake has filed with the court a petition for out of home placement, the court shall, within 24 hours, conduct a hearing on the petition. The court shall notify the parents, the juvenile and his counsel
and, if indigent, have counsel appointed by the court.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-89 (West 1987). For a complete review of the types of
court appointment currently employed in the New Jersey Superior and Municipal
Courts, see Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra note 7, at 856.
84 Alissa P. Worden, PrivatizingDue Process: Issues in the Comparison of Assigned Counsel, Public Defender, and Contracted Indigent Defense Systems, 14 JUST. Svs. J. 390, 392
(1991). Another method of providing counsel is the public defender system in
which a public official's sole function is to defend indigents. State v. Horton, 34 N.J.
518, 524-25, 170 A.2d 1, 4 (1961). The voluntary defender system operates
through a voluntary organization, independently managed and funded, that provides counsel for indigents. Id. The mixed public-private system, on the other
hand, is administered like a voluntary defender system but with public funding. Id.
See also BEANEY, supra note 18, at 212-17 (discussing various methods of indigent
representation).
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members of the bar.8" This type of assignment system, however,
often allocates representation in an arbitrary and haphazard
manner, with minimal central administrative control. 86 Furthermore, in jurisdictions that employ an assigned counsel system,
the burden of representation frequently falls on young, inexperienced attorneys.8 7 Thus, many commentators deem the assigned
counsel system to be a failure."8
In contrast to the traditional assigned counsel system, the
New Jersey system, at its inception, was unique. 9 Under the
original system, attorneys were assigned to represent indigents in
non-capital cases on a rotating basis from an alphabetical list of
the lawyers practicing in each county."0 The New Jersey procedure embodied several advantages over the traditional assignment method. 9 ' New Jersey's program assigned counsel in an
Horton, 34 N.J. at 524, 170 A.2d at 4.
86 Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 627. For example, counsel are
often "picked out of the front row of the courtroom at the arraignment." Id. See also
Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 603, 601 A.2d 211, 217 (1992) (declaring that evidence suggested that counsel in Burlington and Ocean Counties
were assigned based on the frequency of their paid appearances in municipal
court).
87 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 295-96. Trebach also noted that an
attorney's past assignments and experience in criminal courts are often not considered. Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 627. See supra note 10 and accompanying text and infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
unfair implementation of court-appointed assignment and the inexperienced representation that results.
88 See, e.g., EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1951)
(asserting: "[E]xcept possibly in a few rural areas, the assigned counsel system fails
miserably to afford the equal protection under law which it pretends to give and
which the Constitution of the United States contemplates."); Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 290 (agreeing with commentators who posited that the assigned counsel system was "a miserable failure" and "in general, the system of
providing counsel by appointment from the private bar has been found to be defective") (citation omitted).
89 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 290. See also BEANEY, supra note 18,
at 215 (stating that the New Jersey scheme of private appointment is "the most
ambitious effort to date to retain the traditional system"); Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 627 (stating that the NewJersey system was the first of its kind
in the country).
90 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 215. See N.J. CT. R. 3:27-2 (Pressler 1992) (providing that the superior court assignment judge, or other judge, is responsible for
maintaining the list of lawyers); see also supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text
(discussing Revised Rule 1:12-9(e), the predecessor to Rule 3:27).
91 BEANEY, supra note 18, at 215. The assigned counsel system would more equitably distribute assignments and therefore each attorney would be asked to serve
less often. Id. Additionally, because lawyers were required to perform and would
inevitably be compared against one another, attorneys had incentive to perform
efficiently. Id. Finally, Beaney noted that defendants would be less suspicious of
85
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organized fashion, rather than in an ad hoc manner. 92 The New
Jersey Supreme Court, under its extensive rulemaking authority,
also possessed the power to impose the system upon all counties.93 More importantly, the system exhibited greater concern
for an uninformed waiver by an indigent defendant. 94 Finally,
proof of indigency required only that a defendant produce an affidavit attesting to the defendant's inability to procure counsel.95
New Jersey's original assigned counsel system, however, was
not immune from criticism. 96 Primarily, the attorneys' frequent

lack of experience in the area of law involved undermined the
system.97 The timeliness of the assignment created additional
counsel appointed by a systematic plan than a public defender or welfare representative. Id.
92 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 290. In capital cases and post-conviction matters, however, attorneys were specially appointed. Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 637. In addition, judges were permitted to deviate from the
alphabetical listing "where in the opinion of the judge the gravity of the offense
warrants the assignment of special counsel." Id. (quoting Revised Rule 1:12-9(e)
(Gann 1956)). See also N.J. CT. R. 1:26-1 (Soney & Sage 1953) (stating that "[a]n
attorney employed by any judge, magistrate or court clerk, acting in his official capacity, or by any court shall not practice in any court in this State").
93 Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 636.
94 Id. at 630-31. In State v. Raney, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
defendant may waive his constitutional right to counsel by failing to request counsel. State v. Raney, 63 NJ.L. 363, 365, 43 A. 677, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1899). The court
reasoned that the absence of proof that defendants demanded and were denied
counsel created a presumption of waiver. Id. See Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra
note 7, at 630 (concluding that an indigent's silence justified a presumption of
waiver). The court noted that the right to counsel could be waived by the defendant and the mere failure of the court to assign counsel was, in itself, not a denial of
the defendant's right and privilege. Raney, 63 N.J.L. at 365, 43 A. at 678. Prior to
the establishment of the court rules requiring that a defendant be informed of his
right to counsel, a trial court had no duty to inform a defendant of this right. State
v. Murphy, 87 N.J.L. 515, 530, 94 A. 640, 646 (1915); Trebach, Indigent Defendant,
supra note 7, at 630. "By no stretch of the imagination can the provision [the Constitutional right to counsel] be construed to mean that one accused of crime shall
have the benefit of counsel to advise him as to whether or not he shall confess.
Confession is a thing entirely apart from defence upon a trial." Murphy, 87 N.J.L. at
530, 94 A. 646 (emphasis in original).
Under New Jersey's current system, codified in Rule 3:27, there is a presumption against waivers, and a waiver must be expressly made by the defendant
through a written waiver form and further questioning in open court by the judge.
Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 630-31, 635.
95 Id. at 636. Formerly, courts required an investigation regarding the validity of
the affidavit. Id.
96 See BEANEY, supra note 18, at 215-16 (analyzing the various criticisms levied
against the assigned counsel system); Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at
634-35 (same); Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 17, at 290 (same).
97 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 293-95. Not only were most attorneys inexperienced in criminal matters, but they were not assigned frequently
enough to gain the experience needed to effectively represent their clients. Id. at
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problems.9" Under the original system, for example, appointment frequently did not occur until arraignment, thus forcing the
defendant to proceed without counsel and potentially prejudicing his case. 99 Moreover, the assigned counsel system did not
provide funding for access to investigative resources and compensation for expenses, thus frequently limiting an appointed
counsel's factual investigation to questioning the defendant.100
The initial system also provided counsel for indigents primarily
in the county courts, thus depriving municipal indigents of the
right to counsel. 101 Thus, although the municipal courts had become the primary forum for those charged with violating the
law, 10 2 indigents in municipal court were denied the right to
296. According to Trebach, the New Jersey system was really a method of using
amateurs in the field of criminal defense to solve major judicial and social problems
free of charge. Id. at 295. See also BEANEY, supra note 18, at 215 (commenting that
the infrequency of appointments is insufficient to create an experienced defender).
98 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 300. "The average time between
arrest and the first interview between an assigned counsel and his indigent client
was calculated at 76 days for a number of indigent prisoners selected at random in
New Jersey prisons. The average time between arrest and first contact with counsel
for those prisoners who had retained an attorney was 14 days." Id. See also Trebach,
Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 634-35 (noting that indigents were deprived of
counsel at interrogation and preliminary hearings, rarely receiving counsel until
months after arrest).
99 Id. at 635. For example, unaware of the right to remain silent under the Miranda rule, defendants might sign a confession due to police threats. Trebach, Modem Defender, supra note 7, at 300. While awaiting contact with an appointed lawyer,
defendants would often be coerced into waiving their right to jury trial, indictment
or even the right to counsel. Id. at 301. Because post-conviction representation was
assigned at the judge's discretion, prisoners would often spend years in jail before
consulting with an attorney regarding an appeal or other legal matters. Id. at 30203.
In 1956, however, Revised Rule 8:3-3 was amended to allow defendants to be
informed of their right to counsel at preliminary hearings and to assigned counsel
prior to arraignment "whenever practicable." Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra
note 7, at 635 & n.42.
100 Id. at 637. Further compounding this problem, New Jersey's once limited
criminal discovery process left the assigned counsel with little more than the information prosecutors were willing to provide. Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7,
at 303-04. The prosecutor often provided only evasive and incriminating information to appointed counsel. Id. Moreover, because compensation was not permitted
in non-capital cases, the appointed attorney bore any investigatory expenses.
Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 638.
101 Id. at 634; Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 17, at 297.
102 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 297-99 & n.25. For example, municipal courts handle six million violations each year that include traffic violations,
43,000 drunk-driving cases and a significant amount of drug cases downgraded because of "Superior Court congestion." Appointed Counsel, 125 N.J. L.J. 678 (1990).
The superior court congestion also forces municipal courts to handle minor state
crimes. Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 17, at 297-98.
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counsel, despite the rule's express provision that counsel should
be appointed "in any court."' t0 3 Further, when counsel was assigned in the lower courts, judges frequently did not adhere to
the alphabetical rotation system.' °4
C. Right to Compensation in New Jersey
Appointed counsel's right to compensation originated in
section 2:190-3 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes. 10 5 Section
2A:163-1 of New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 10 6 succeeded this
statute and authorized compensation in murder cases, as did the
corresponding Court Rule, Revised Rule 2:12-1(b)." °7 In conprovided
trast to the statute, however, the Revised Rule
08
compensation.1
permissive
than
rather
mandatory
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Rush,' 09 ad103 Id. at 297; Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 634. See supra note 7980 and accompanying text (discussing Revised Rule 1:12-9(a)).
104 Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 637; see also Appointed Counsel, supra
note 102, at 678 (noting that appointments of counsel in New Jersey are often
made inconsistently within the counties); Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra
note 7, at 862 (outlining the various methods of assignment that judges employed).
105 State v. Donaldson, 36 N.J. 45, 48, 174 A.2d 896, 898 (1961) (citing N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2:190-3). Section 2:190-3 provided:
The court before which any person shall be tried upon indictment
shall, if he is not able to procure counsel, assign to him counsel, not
exceeding two, who shall have free access to such person at all reasonable hours. For services rendered by counsel so assigned, in cases of
homicide, a reasonable compensation may be fixed and allowed by the judge of
the court before which the trial shall be had, and the sum so fixed and allowed shall be paid by the treasurer of the county wherein the indictment is found, upon presentation of the certificate of the judge, fixing
and allowing such compensation.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:190-3 (1937) (emphasis added).
106 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:163-1, enacted in 1952, provided:
Where counsel assigned by the court to represent a defendant in a
murder case has been allowed compensation by the court for his services, the sum so fixed shall be paid by the county treasurer of the
county where the indictment was found, upon presentation of a certificate of the judge, fixing and allowing such compensation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-1 (West 1985).
107 Donaldson, 36 N.J. at 48-49, 174 A.2d at 898-99. New Jersey Revised Court
Rule 2:12-1(b) was adopted in 1948 to provide compensation in homicide cases.
Donaldson, 36 N.J. at 48-49, 74 A.2d at 898-99. In accordance with the 1952 statutory revision, the judiciary replaced the Rule with Revised Rule 1:12-9(d). Id. at 50,
174 A.2d at 899; State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 527, 170 A.2d 1, 6 (1961). See also
supra note 79-80 and accompanying text (providing the text of Revised Rule 1:129(d)).
108 Horton, 34 N.J. at 527, 170 A.2d at 6.
109 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
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dressed compensation in non-murder cases. "0 Assigned counsel
applied for and was denied compensation and reimbursement for
out-of-pocket expenses."' On appeal,' 1 2 the attorney asserted
that uncompensated service violated both his and his clients' constitutional rights.' '3 Rejecting the attorney's claim that his clients were denied a right to counsel," l4 the New Jersey Supreme
Court repudiated the constitutional arguments, noting that these
claims had been denied in other cases. 1 5 Although the court asserted that lawyers had a professional obligation to defend the
poor, 1 1 6 it unanimously concluded that attorneys should no
longer be required to absorb the total cost of an indigent's defense. 1 7 Nevertheless, Justice Weintraub announced that the
court would not immediately exercise the authority to mandate
compensation, but determined that counsel was entitled to outof-pocket expenses.118
11o Id. at 402, 217 A.2d at 442. In Rush, several indigents required representation for assault and weapons charges ranging from concealing weapons to assault
with intent to kill. Id.
I''

Id.

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification before argument was
heard in the Appellate Division. Id.
113 Id. at 405, 407, 217 A.2d at 444, 445. Specifically, counsel claimed that an
assignment without compensation constituted a taking without just compensation
and a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 407, 217 A.2d at 445.
114 Id. at 405-06, 217 A.2d at 444. The court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the proposition that an assigned attorney will fail to meet obligations simply because the attorney is not paid. Id. Additionally, the court pointed
out that an assigned lawyer is no less qualified than a paid attorney. Id. at 406, 217
A.2d at 444. Finally, the court concluded that prior experience in criminal matters
is not essential and that few cases are won or lost on the skills of the advocate. Id. at
406-07, 217 A.2d at 445.
115 Id. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (asserting that
"[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by such an appointment"); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th
Cir. 1965) (rejecting counselor's assertion that appointment without compensation
was a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966); State v. Clifton, 172 So. 2d 657, 661 (La. 1965) (concluding that appointment of counsel without fee was not a taking without just compensation because part of an attorney's professional obligations were to promote the cause of
justice which included indigent representation).
116 Rush, 46 N.J. at 408, 217 A.2d at 445.
117 Id. at 412, 217 A.2d at 448. The court explained that criminal cases were no
longer simple matters, and that the legal needs of an indigent often extend to appeals and other post-conviction proceedings. Id. Thus, the court declared that the
taxpayers should share in the burden of defending indigents. Id. at 413, 217 A.2d at
448. The court suggested that reasonable compensation would be 60% of the fee
that an ordinary client would spend on a modestly successful attorney. Id.
118 Id. at 415, 416, 217 A.2d at 449, 450. Justice Weintraub relied on three separate statutory provisions as authority to order compensation. Id. at 414, 217 A.2d at
449 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:158-4, -5, -7 ). Specifically, § 2A:158-4 stated
112
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Responding to the court's failure to mandate compensation
in Rush, the legislature adopted the Public Defender Act." 9 Of
particular significance was the enactment of a provision, following the court's 1974 decision in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 120 mandating that public defenders represent defendants charged with
disorderly persons offenses or with violating penal laws, ordinances or regulations that were likely to result in imprisonment
or "other consequences of magnitude."'' 2 1 Since the provision's
inception, however, the legislature has not adequately funded the
Public Defender's Office.1 2 2 As a result, the private bar must assume the responsibility of representing indigents when the Pubthat "[tihe criminal business of the State shall be prosecuted exclusively" by the
county prosecutor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-4 (West 1985). Section 2A:158-5
provided that the prosecutor "shall use all reasonable and lawful diligence for the
detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158-5 (West 1985). Finally, § 2A:158-7 stated that the county
treasurer would pay "all necessary expenses incurred by the prosecutor for each
county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the
laws." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
The court reasoned, however, that the legislature should have an opportunity
to determine how the state's obligation to compensate appointed counsel should be
met. Rush, 46 N.J. at 415, 217 A.2d at 449. Centralizing the indigent defense system through a public defender, the court proclaimed, had several advantages over
the current system. Id.The court asserted that a central office would not only be
more efficient for investigatorial services, but would also cut costs because only one
office, rather than separately assigned attorneys, would require funding. Id.
Out-of-pocket expenses included traveling costs outside the local area, toll
calls, and incidental investigation expenses. State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 534, 170
A.2d 1, 9 (1961). Compensated out-of-pocket expenses would not include secretarial services, office supplies and other general "office overhead" expenses. Id.
119 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-1 to -25 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); In re Antini, 53
N.J. 488, 492, 251 A.2d 291, 293 (1969). See supra note 69 and accompanying text
(discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A-1).
120 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971). After Rodriguez, the state public defender
provided representation to indigents charged with non-indictable offenses. Bailey,
supra note 77, at 1187. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing
Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt).
121 The provision, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:158A-5.2, provided:
The Public Defender shall . . .provide for the legal representation of
any person charged with a disorderly persons offense or with the violation of any law, ordinance or regulation of a penal nature where
there is a likelihood that the persons so charged, if convicted, will be
subject to imprisonment or, in the opinion of the court, any other
consequence of magnitude.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5.2 (West 1985).
122 Bailey, supra note 77, at 15. See Richard Pliskin, Court Upholds Mandatory Pro
Bono, Finds Lawyers Have No Constitutional Right to Fees, 130 N.J. L.J. 473 (Feb. 17,
1992) (noting that the legislature has failed to provide any funds during the statute's almost 20 year life).
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lic Defender's Office cannot. 23 Unfortunately, courts within
different counties often arbitrarily and unfairly assign counsel,
placing the entire county's burden on a few attorneys. 1 24 Thus,
the legislature's failure to fund the Public Defender Act effectively created an inequitable and potentially unconstitutional
1 25
mandatory pro bono requirement for New Jersey lawyers.
IV.

MADDEN V. TOWNSHIP OF DELRAN

The obligation to perform pro bono services stems from
English 1 26 and American history' 27 and the American Bar Associ123 See Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 NJ. 591, 594-95, 614, 601 A.2d 211,
212-13, 222 (1992).
124 See Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra note 7, at 862 (stating that
"[diespite R. 3:27-2, there is no uniformity in the municipal courts of this state, or
even within many vicinages concerning assignment of counsel to indigents"); Bailey, supra note 77, at 1187 (asserting that some municipalities appoint paid public
defenders while others appoint unpaid private attorneys on a case-by-case basis);
Trebach, Indigent Defendant, supra note 7, at 637 (explaining that because assignment
on an alphabetical basis in non-capital cases evoked criticism, many judges began
deviating from the practice by appointing, in their opinion, more qualified counsel); A Pro Bono Talent Bank, 125 N.J. L.J. 1736 (1990) [hereinafter Talent Bank] (stating that the difficulty of the present system is that its haphazard distribution of the
workload overworks some and underworks others). Moreover, these appointed attorneys must assume the costs associated with representing their indigent clients.
See, e.g., Div. of Youth & Family Serv. v. D.C., 118 NJ. 388, 402, 571 A.2d 1295,
1302 (1990) (denying payment of fees for counsel appointed in a parental-rights
termination case); State v. Monaghan, 184 NJ. Super. 340, 344, 446 A.2d 185, 187
(1982) (asserting that a court-appointed attorney in municipal court was not entitled to compensation until the necessary appropriations were made); In re Spann
Contempt, 183 NJ. Super. 62, 68, 443 A.2d 239, 243 (1982) (noting that until the
legislature appropriated funds that would allow the Public Defender to fulfill his
responsibilities under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 158-5.2, members of the bar must continue to bear the burden of indigent representation); Norton v. State, 167 N.J.
Super. 212, 217, 400 A.2d 801, 805 (1979) (representation of those charged with
non-indictable offenses will be on an individual rotating basis in accord with In re
Antini, 53 N.J. 488, 251 A.2d 291 (1969)).
125 Bailey, supra note 77, at 1187. "To command the practicing bar to shoulder
the burden of the poor is a tragic injustice to the constitutional rights of the indigent and the attorney." Id. "To the indigent client the pro bono process is a constitutional nightmare." Id. at 1196.
126 Pro bono service originated in fifteenth-century England. Wechsler, supra
note 3, at 911. From 1495 to 1883, an informa pauperis statute allowed civil indigents to sue. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 741. Under the statute a chancellor assigned representation for litigation. Id. On the criminal side, indigents were
permitted to sue in forma pauperis by granting dock briefs. Id. at 742. Under this
practice, a prisoner who was entitled to counsel would offer a brief for the sum of
one guinea to a barrister who was obligated to accept the appointment. Id. In England, sergeants-at-law were obligated to represent indigents without compensation;
the frequency with which English courts appointed counsel, however, remains uncertain. Id. at 745-46. See also Hills, supra note 8, at 1002 (examining the obligations of English sergeants-at-law). Shapiro argued, however, that because
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sergeants-at-law were not the equivalent of an American attorney, the duties imposed on them had little relevance to the obligations of an attorney practicing in
the United States. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 746. Both English lawyers and members of the bar who tried cases considered sergeants-at-law to be the elite; they
commanded higher fees than their peers, and were selected only after many years
of practice. Id. Notably, only sergeants-at-law could become judges. Id. Today, a
government-supported legal assistance program has replaced the gratuitous service
of representing indigents. Id. at 742 n.30.
127 In the United States, the duty to perform pro bono service has been generally
recognized throughout history. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 911-12 & n.6. For a discussion on the history of uncompensated appointed service to indigents see United
States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (1965). Following the Revolutionary War, the
American state courts appointed counsel for criminal indigents. Hills, supra note 8,
at 1002. The circumstances under which an indigent was entitled to counsel, however, varied. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 750. For example, some states followed the
English practice that limited the availability of counsel to criminal proceedings. Id.
See notes 18-32 and accompanying text (discussing English right to counsel). Other
states recognized a broader right to counsel, and yet still others enacted statutes
that specifically granted the right to those charged with capital offenses or other
serious crimes. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 750. New Jersey fell into this latter category. Id. See also note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the 1795 statute that
recognized and required the assignment of counsel in all criminal indictments). In
1790, Congress enacted the first federal statute, 1 Stat. 118 (1790), that recognized
an attorney's obligation to serve in cases of treason or other capital offenses. Dillon,
346 F.2d at 637 (1965).
On the civil side, organized legal aid did not appear until the late nineteenth
century. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 752. In 1892, Congress passed the "Act of July
20, 1892," giving civil indigents the right to proceed informa pauperis. Id. at 752 &
n.78 (citing ACT OFJULY 20, 1892, ch. 209, §§ 1-5, 27 STAT. 252 (1892)). Similarly
other statutes provided for the appointment of counsel in civil cases. Shapiro, supra
note 26, at 752 n.78 (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(l) (1976)). Today this act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing 28 U.S.C. 1915(d)).
128 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 912; Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 997. Under
the Canons of Professional Ethics of 1908, the earliest code of ethics, the ABA
recognized a lawyer's duty to represent assigned indigents. Wechsler, supra note 3,
at 912; Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 997 & n.1. Canon 4 stated: "A lawyer
assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any
trivial reason, and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf." ABA CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 4 (1937). Similarly, Canon 12 read: "A client's ... poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all." Id. at Canon 12.
In 1969, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the Canons of
Professional Ethics, continuing recognition of a lawyer's obligation to provide free
legal assistance. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 912. Specifically, Ethical Consideration
2-25 of the Code provided:
Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services
or accepted court appointments on behalf of such individuals. The
basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to
pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer ....
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should
find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition
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of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues
to be an obligation of each lawyer ....
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1983).
In 1977, the ABA first attempted to establish a mandatory pro bono requirement for the legal profession. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 917-18. Specifically, President William B. Spann, Jr. appointed a Special Commission on Professional
Standards in 1977 to review and redraft the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 919 n.65. This commission, named the Kutak Commission after its
Chairman, RobertJ. Kutak, proposed the adoption of Rule 6.1. Bretz, supra note 1,
at 623 nn.5-6 (MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (Discussion Draft
1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (special ed. Feb. 19, 1980) [hereinafter Discussion
Draft]). The proposed rule read:
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer
may discharge this responsibility by service in activities for improving
the law, the legal system, or the legal profession, or by providing professional services to persons of limited means or to public service
groups or organizations. A lawyer shall make an annual report concerning such service to an appropriate regulatory authority.
Discussion Draft, supra, at 118 (emphasis added). Strong opposition to the proposed
Rule and its inclusion of the word "shall," however, forced the commission to revise Rule 6.1 so that the Model Rules would be passed. Bretz, supra note 1, at 62324; see also Chesterfield H. Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard: Its Time Has
Come, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727, 728 (1981) (noting other shortcomings in the proposed Rule including means of enforcement, the amount of pro bono service required, exemptions from service and implied mistrust of lawyers). Although the
proposed rule was eventually redrafted, the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1983, again acknowledged a pro bono publico obligation. Bretz,
supra note 1, at 624. Literally translated, pro bono publico means for the good of the
state. Bellacosa, supra note 1, at 747. Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provided in pertinent part:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee
or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or
charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial
support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of
limited means.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) (emphasis added).
Recently, ChiefJudge Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals appointed a
committee to study the availability of legal services for the poor in New York and to
recommend improvements. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 922 & n.81. The Marrero
Committee, named after its chairman, Victor Marrero, proposed a minimum pro
bono requirement of 40 hours of "qualifying" legal services every two years for all
registered attorneys practicing in New York State. Bellacosa, supra note 1, at 748 &
n. 10 (citing Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final Report
to the ChiefJudge of the State of New York (April 1990), reprinted in 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 755 (1991) [hereinafter Marrero Committee Report]). Summarizing the Marrero
Committee Report, one commentator reported:
Qualifying services included those:
a) rendered in civil matters to those who cannot afford counsel or in
criminal matters where there is no governmental obligation to provide funds for counsel;
b) related to improvement of the administration of justice by simpli-
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Delran,'2 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of involuntary pro bono service without compensation.'3 0 John Lee Madden and his law firm brought an action
seeking compensation for his services and a declaration that the
New Jersey assigned counsel system was unconstitutional.' 3 '
A unanimous court validated the assigned counsel system in
municipal courts, but ChiefJustice Wilentz, writing for the court,
noted that the assignments were unfairly distributed among
members of the bar.' 32 The court, therefore, ordered that counfying the legal process for or increasing the availability and quality of
legal services to the poor;
c) provided to charitable public interest organizations on matters
which are designed predominantly to address the needs of the poor.
Justin L. Vigdor, Pro Bono Service: Mandatory or Voluntary?, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 1990, at
32, 33.
Because of strong opposition to the proposed mandatory rule, Chief Justice
Wachtler delayed its imposition until 1992. Watkins, supra note 1, at 179. See also
Vigdor, supra, at 33 (noting that responses to the Marrero Committee's plan were
"intense and frequently strident"). In response to the opposition, a special committee of the New York State Bar Association, chaired by Justin Vigdor, proposed
an alternate plan that recommended encouraging lawyers to take part in pro bono
activities through conferences, surveys and other measures designed to stimulate
voluntary participation. Id. at 33, 34-35. In May 1992, Chief Judge Wachtler postponed the decision to adopt a mandatory pro bono requirement another year because it appeared that voluntary programs were on the rise. Spencer, supra note 6,
at 1.
129 126 N.J. 591, 601 A.2d 211 (1992).
130 Id. at 597, 601 A.2d at 214 (citing Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295,
277 A.2d 216 (1971)). See supra note 115 (discussing similar actions brought by
appointed counsel seeking compensation for representation of indigent
defendants).
131 Madden, 126 N.J. at 597, 601 A.2d at 214. A municipal court judge appointed
Madden to represent an indigent charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. at 59697, 601 A.2d at 213. The municipal court denied Madden's application for fees. Id.
at 597, 601 A.2d at 213. Shortly after Madden filed suit in superior court, the municipality offered to compensate him in full, but he refused. Id. at 597, 601 A.2d at
214. The court, therefore, interpreted Madden's refusal to accept compensation as
a conversion of the suit into an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the assigned counsel system was unconstitutional and that compensation should be mandated. Id. Rejecting Madden's claims, the trial court sustained the constitutionality
of the assigned counsel system. Id. at 596, 601 A.2d at 213. The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed. Id. Granting certification, the New Jersey
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the issue of compensation for assigned counsel was ripe for review. Id.
132 Id. at 605-06, 601 A.2d at 218. Testimonial evidence suggested that assignment in several municipalities in Burlington and possibly Ocean Counties was
based on the frequency of paid court appearances. Id. at 603-04, 601 A.2d at 217.
The court admitted, however, that the extent of the unfairness of assigned representation in other counties was unknown. Id. at 604, 601 A.2d at 217. See infra note
276 and accompanying text (discussing ChiefJustice Wilentz's current reaction to
the legislature's failure to adequately fund the public defender system).
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sel would be assigned in strict accordance with Rule 3:27-2 under
a revised system.13 3 Additionally, the court declined to order the
government to compensate counsel assigned by the municipal
court. 3 4 Ordering counties to pay counsel, the court reasoned,
would inhibit the flexibility of the assigned counsel system on
3 5
which many municipalities relied.

The court considered and rejected Madden's constitutional
challenges to the system, noting that only his equal protection
claim differed from the claims asserted in Rush.'3 6 Similar to the
attorney in State v. Rush, Madden contended that the assigned
133 Id. at 606, 601 A.2d at 218. See also supra note 81 and accompanying text
(setting forth Rule 3:27). The court ordered the assignment judge for each vicinage to prepare a list, from which assignments would be made in an alphabetical
rotation, of every licensed New Jersey attorney whose primary office was in that
vicinage. Madden, 126 N.J. at 606, 601 A.2d at 218. The court, moreover, stated
that it would determine indigency in strict accordance with the standards set forth
by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Id. Compliance with the rule, the court
ordered, would be effective May 1, 1992. Id. at 607, 601 A.2d at 218. The court
would hold a trial court administrator responsible for supplying the municipal
courts with a list of attorneys and informing the courts which attorneys were eligible for appointment. Id., 601 A.2d at 218-19. In addition, the court required an
administrator to monitor implementation of the system in each vicinage. Id. See also
Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra note 7, at 863 (recommending implementation of a revised assigned counsel system).
134 Madden, 126 N.J. at 612-13, 601 A.2d at 221. Notably, the court conceded
that past decisions may have implied a power to mandate compensation. Id., 601
A.2d at 221-22 (citing State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 414-15, 217 A.2d 441,449 (1966);
In re Antini, 53 N.J. 488, 495, 251 A.2d 291, 294-95 (1969)).
135 Id. at 613-14, 601 A.2d at 222. For example, under the assigned counsel system some municipalities provide a public defender or paid counsel on a voluntary
basis. Id. The court also noted that to order compensation would require implementation of a statewide mandatory structure that should be left to the legislative
and executive branches for development. Id. at 614, 601 A.2d at 222.
136 Id. at 597-98, 599, 601 A.2d at 214, 215. With respect to the denial of the
right to counsel, the Madden court rejected the assertion that counsel experienced
in municipal court proceedings were necessarily more qualified than assigned counsel. Id. at 598, 601 A.2d at 214. ChiefJustice Wilentz noted that the right to counsel was only the right to effective assistance of counsel, not the best counsel. Id. at
599, 601 A.2d at 215 (citing United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442, 444-45 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971)).
Similarly, the court concluded that the petitioner's claim of a taking without
just compensation or due process was unfounded. Id. at 600, 601 A.2d at 215. The
court reasoned that to sustain a claim of a due process violation, plaintiffs must
demonstrate a greater burden on the bar than that asserted by Madden. Id. at 60001, 601 A.2d at 215-16 (citing State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 408, 217 A.2d 441, 44546 (1966)). Conversely, petitioners in Madden only demonstrated that a few lawyers
may be unconstitutionally burdened rather than an entire state bar. Id. at 601, 601
A.2d at 216. The court also pointed out that although some jurisdictions award
compensation for mandatory assignments, compulsory uncompensated representation for indigents in NewJersey dates back to colonial times. Id. at 600 & n.2, 601
A.2d at 215 & n.2.
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counsel system was a taking of private property without just comto due process, equal protecpensation, and a denial of the rights
3 7
counsel.'
to
right
the
and
tion
Rejecting Madden's equal protection claim, the court explained that while the assignment of counsel in Burlington
County was clearly unfair, no evidence demonstrated that the
system was unfairly implemented throughout the state. 138 Despite this uncertainty and the disproportionate impact on a small
number of attorneys, the court concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to deem the entire assigned counsel system
3 9
unconstitutional. 1
Although the Madden court upheld the constitutionality of
the assigned counsel system, the court expressed serious concern
over its future effectiveness without financial support from the
legislature.' 40 The court maintained that an ideal system consisted of paid public defenders.' 4 ' A publicly-funded defender
system, the court reasoned, would meet the legal needs of indigent defendants more effectively and relieve the bar of a societal
burden.142 The court refused to compel the government to comMadden, 126 N.J. at 597-98, 601 A.2d at 214.
Id. at 603-04, 601 A.2d at 217. A survey conducted by the Administrative
Office of the Courts indicated, however, that most of the counties followed the
method set forth in Rule 3:27-2. Id. See Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra
note 7, at 862 (discussing method of assignment in NewJersey under Rule 3:27-2);
see also note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the inequities in appointment of
counsel under New Jersey's assigned counsel system).
'39 Madden, 126 N.J. at 605, 601 A.2d at 218. The court also considered other
aspects of the equal protection problem, including inequities in the burden of indigent representation between counties and the absence of similar impositions on
other professionals. Id. at 610-11, 601 A.2d at 220-21. Nevertheless, the court
maintained that the revised system would eliminate any disparities within the legal
profession regarding court-appointed counsel. Id. at 611, 601 A.2d at 220-21. See
also note 133 and accompanying text for a review of the revised assigned counsel
system as ordered by the Madden court. The court declined to consider other possible constitutional violations of the assigned counsel system such as inefficiency, financial constraints and counsel's lack of experience. See Madden, 126 N.J. at 611,
601 A.2d at 221.
140 Id. at 595, 601 A.2d at 213. Specifically, Chief Justice Wilentz stated: "We
cannot forever accept a system so clearly inefficient, historically unfair, and potentially unconstitutional." Id. at 595-96, 601 A.2d at 213.
141 Id. at 608, 614, 601 A.2d at 219, 222. The court referred in particular to the
success of the former public defender system in Jersey City, New Jersey that yielded
more than 5 million dollars in profit in 1990. Id. at 609, 601 A.2d at 220. An ideal
system, the court argued, would provide a public defender in every municipality. Id.
at 614, 601 A.2d at 222.
142 Id. at 594-95, 601 A.2d at 212-13. The court indicated that it did not intend
to diminish the attorney's traditional duty to perform pro bono work. Id. at 595,
601 A.2d at 213. To the contrary, the court recognized the increasing need for pro
'37
138
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pensate appointed counsel, and instead encouraged the legislature and other branches of government to address the
problem. 143 In the interim, the court conceded, the private bar
would have to continue to bear the burden of mandatory repre44
sentation of indigent defendants.
V.

MANDATORY PRO BONO: THE ARGUMENTS

The legal profession has debated the issue of mandatory pro
bono since the late nineteenth century.' 45 As the civil and criminal legal needs of the poor remain unsatisfied, 14 6 the role of the
private bar in meeting those needs continues to cause considera47
ble controversy. 1
A.

Arguments Supporting Mandatory Pro Bono

Supporters advocate mandatory pro bono because it would
fill the currently unsatisfied need to provide the poor with access
to legal representation. 4 8 Studies have estimated that approxibono service from willing lawyers on a voluntary basis. Id. The court maintained,
however, that despite the judicial policy favoring voluntary cooperation, the growing burden of indigent representation in the municipal courts can no longer be
provided by the bar alone. Id. at 595-96, 601 A.2d at 213.
143 Id. at 612, 601 A.2d at 221. In addition, because of potential individual rights
and Appropriation Clause problems, the court declined to use funds appropriated
to the Pubic Defender under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:158A-1 to -25 in any manner
other than that which the legislature intended. Id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2,
Para. 2). The court also noted that a redistribution of funds allocated to the Public
Defender might reduce the amount available for the defense of those charged with
indictable offenses or prematurely exhaust the Public Defender's budget. Id. at 612,
601 A.2d at 221. At least one commentator noted that -[t]he Supreme Court is
sending out a strong message to both the Legislature and to local governments to
do something about this problem before they are forced into action." Pliskin, supra
note 122, at 490 (quoting Robert Ramsey, name partner at Trenton's Burbage &
Ramsey). See also infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice
Wilentz's threatened action to compel compensation for attorneys).
144 Madden, 126 N.J. at 594-95, 601 A.2d at 212-13. The court warned: "In the
meantime, the bar, which has shouldered the sometimes heavy burden of what is
clearly an obligation of the public, an obligation imposed on the state constitutionally ... will have to continue to bear it, as it has been borne by so many others for
so many years." Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) and quoting
Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216, 233 (1971)).
145 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 735, 749-50; Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 997.
146 Graham, supra note 6, at 63; Slobodin, supra note 1, at 13; Stevens, supra note
8, at 767-68; Watkins, supra note 1, at 177.
147 Bretz, supra note 1, at 623; Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical
And Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 255 (1981); Spencer, supra
note 1, at 493-94.
148 Weschler, supra note 3, at 924. See also Spencer, supra note 1, at 494 (determining that the main motivation in public service is born out of need: "the unmet
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mately thirteen percent of the United States' population, or over
thirty million people, live below the poverty line.' 4 9 Census statistics further indicate that this group is increasing steadily.'
At
the same time, funding allocated to the legal needs of the poor
51
has declined since the advent of the Reagan Administration.'
An explosive growth in the number of laws and regulations has
created a dependency on lawyers in all segments of the population, 152 but voluntary programs have not met the demand for inlegal need, which falls most heavily on the poor, the elderly, and various minority
groups"). The primary legal needs of this sector generally fall within several areas:
family law, landlord/tenant and social security and other governmental benefits.
Bretz, supra note 1, at 625-26. See also Weschler, supra note 3, at 915 (noting that
80% of the legal problems of the poor "arise 'in the areas of family law, consumer
law, housing law and administrative law' ") (quoting Thomas Ehrlich, RationingJustice, 34 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 729, 734
(1979)). Other problem areas include public benefits, health, utility, discrimination
and unemployment. Id. at 915 n.32.
Notably, as the courts continue to expand an individual's right to counsel, the
need for lawyers among all sectors of the population, especially the poor, continues
to grow. Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1022 & n.Ill. See, e.g., Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (mandating counsel at "complex" probation
revocation hearings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (recognizing welfare recipients' right to counsel, if so desired, in pre-termination hearing); Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1968) (requiring counsel for sentencing); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (deeming counsel required in juvenile delinquency proceedings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1967) (asserting that counsel
was required at lineups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (requiring
counsel at custodial interrogations).
In addition, social legislation is expanding the remedies available to those successful in civil litigation. Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1022 n. 111.
149 Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFTSRA L. REV. 1113, 1119
(1991) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 38 (1989)). The poverty line is "defined as a family of four living on an
annual income of less than $12,000." Id.
150 Lisa S. Tudzin, Pro Bono Work: Should It Be Mandatory Or Voluntary?, 12 J. LEGAL
PROF. 103, 109 (1987). The number of poor people in America increased from 29.5
million in 1980 to 35.3 million in 1983. Id.
151 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 916. Before 1965, the Office of Economic Opportunity provided legal assistance to the poor with an average annual budget of $4
million. Cramton, supra note 149, at 1118. In 1975, Congress passed the Legal
Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996, which established the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC). Id. The LSC was a partially federally funded program designed
to assist the civil legal needs of the poor who qualified for aid. Id. At its peak, in
1981, the LSC maintained a $321 million budget and employed almost 6,000 lawyers. Id.; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 916; Vigdor, supra note 128, at 33.
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, however, Congress slowly began
to slash the LSC's budget. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 916. In 1982 and 1983, funding was cut to $260 million, and by 1987 only 3,000 LSC-funded lawyers remained.
Id. at 916-17. This policy continued under the Bush Administration, and today it is
estimated that the LSC can address only 6% of the indigents in need of legal services. Id. at 917.
152 Those *x!!! Lawyers, TIME, Apr. 10, 1978, at 56.
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digent legal services.' 5 3 This failure has occurred in part because
both lawyers and the American Bar Association (ABA) define voluntary pro bono loosely 5 4 - attorneys actively provide pro
bono services within these definitions - but not for those who
need it most, the poor. 1 5 5 Moreover, many lawyers do not give
pro bono participation priority because of the nature of the
1 56
poor's legal problems.
Another prominent argument supporting mandatory pro
bono revolves around the role of the lawyer as an "officer of the
court.' ' 157 Under this doctrine, courts have considered an attorney an employee of the court required to perform various legal
tasks.' 5 8 The courts, therefore, concluded that the obligation to
153 Graham, supra note 6, at 63. According to the ABA's 1987 Directory of Private Bar Involvement Programs only "15.1 percent of the country's licensed attorneys participate in formal pro bono programs." Id.
154 For example, Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct describes
pro bono work as "service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or
the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal
services to persons of limited means." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
Rule 6.1 (1983). See supra note 128 and accompanying text regarding the treatment
of pro bono obligations in the ABA's ethical rules.
155 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 914 (explaining that lawyers often consider serving
on the local boards of hospitals, schools, and various other associations as satisfaction of their pro bono duty).
156 John A. Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A.J.
564, 564 (Apr. 1979). As Humbach stated: "Nobody wants to devote $500 blocks
of lawyers' time to $15 problems." Id. Critics argue, however, that the legal needs
of the poor do not merely concern "financial inconveniences ... [but rather] pain
and survival." Spencer, supra note 1, at 496-97. As Spencer stated:
We are talking about survival. We are talking about real people living
in rat-infested, lead-painted, fire-trap housing. We are talking about
the denial of benefits needed for food or medical treatment. We are
talking about unfair marketing or credit practices that make living necessities take an unduly large portion of unduly small incomes. We
are talking about securing alimony and child-support payments. We
are talking about abusive treatment by public agencies. We are talking about job discrimination and sexual harassment. We are talking
about areas of human, social, and economic relations in which the law
has been notoriously slow to develop and even more notoriously slow
to be implemented at all levels of society ....
Id. at 496.
157 Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 279. See also Matalon, supra note 2, at 563 (discussing the origins of the officer of the court doctrine in the United States).
Harvard University Professor of Law, David Shapiro, however, challenged the obligation to perform pro bono services under this doctrine, noting that "[t]o justify
coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tradition in England
and the United States is to read into that tradition a story that is not there." Shapiro, supra note 26, at 753.
158 Matalon, supra note 3, at 563. See also Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1026
& n. 119 (pointing out that "every member of the profession, as a professional and as
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provide pro bono services was an implied condition of the license
159
to practice law.

Likewise, the professional responsibility argument, a corollary to the officer of the court doctrine, posits that each lawyer
has an ethical obligation to assist the poor. 6 ° The ABA codified
an officer of the law, has a unique obligation and responsibility to make some contribution to the satisfaction of [the legal needs of indigents]").
159 Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 279; Stevens, supra note 8, at 778. The New
Jersey Supreme Court has recognized the officer of the court doctrine. See, e.g.,
State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 410, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966). In Rush, Chief Justice
Weintraub stated:
The duty to defend the indigent without charge is not a personal duty
in the conventional sense of an obligation owed by one man to another, for the breach or nonperformance of which that other is entitled to dollar or other relief. A lawyer does not owe free
representation to any and every indigent who chooses to demand it of
him. Rather the duty is owed to the Court, and it is the Court's call that he is
obliged to answer. The duty is to assist the Court in the business before it. The
duty thus is an incident of the license to practice law ....
Id. (emphasis added).
For the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the officer of the court
doctrine, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (writing for the majority,
Justice Sutherland declared that "[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and are
bound to render service when required by such an appointment") (citation omitted). In a pointed dissent in Mallardv. United States Dist. Court,Justice Stevens maintained that "a court's power to require a lawyer to render assistance to the indigent
is firmly rooted in the authority to define the terms and conditions upon which
members are admitted to the bar .... " 490 U.S. 296, 312 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672
(5th Cir. 1965) (asserting that attorneys, as officers of the court, have an obligation
to represent indigents upon court order without compensation); Daines v. Markoff,
555 P.2d 490, 493 (Nev. 1976) (stating that "[t]he professional obligation to respond to the call of the court is an incident of the privilege to practice law, and does
not offend constitutional commands") (citations omitted); State v. Green, 470
S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo. 1971) (Seiler, J., concurring) (positing that the judicial system cannot operate without lawyers and therefore "lawyers cannot escape being
officers of the court and cannot escape a certain amount of pro bono publico work,
which inevitably go with the special and exclusive privilege of being allowed to represent others in the court"); People v. Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ill. 1966)
(asserting that the lawyer's license to practice the law is accompanied by an obligation to serve the court); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1965). In Dillon, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
[R]epresentation of indigents under court order, without a fee, is a
condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of
the court, and that the obligation of the legal profession to serve without compensation has been modified only by statute. An applicant for
admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the
traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one
of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order.
Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
160 Matalon, supra note 3, at 570. According to the professional responsibility
argument, a lawyer has a professional responsibility to represent indigents to guar-
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this obligation in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Rules). 16 1 Critics have argued, however, that a lawyer's professional responsibilities under the Model Code and Rules are only
aspirational in nature and do not require strict compliance with a
pro bono obligation. 6 2 Further, the duty to perform pro bono
may now be hindered by factors not present many years ago,
such as the increasing financial burdens of operating a legal practice. 16 3 Finally, some commentators maintain that compelled service spoils the moral significance and personal gratification of the
choice to provide pro bono service.'16
Proponents of mandatory pro bono have nevertheless asserted that because lawyers have a "monopoly" on legal services,
they should be required to provide pro bono assistance to indigents.' 65 The license to practice law is an exclusive privilege,
antee that their basic rights are not violated. Spencer, supra note 1, at 502. See also
Morris S. Dees, Legal Services for the Poor-A Lawyer's Ethical Duty and Proposalsfor
Expanded State Support, 5 CUMB. L. REV. 258, 260-61 (1974) (stating that lawyers
have a professional obligation to ensure that all citizens enjoy "equal protection of
the law[s]").
161 Matalon, supra note 3, at 570-71. See note 128 and accompanying text (discussing codification of pro bono duty in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
162 Dees, supra note 160, at 260 (claiming that each lawyer must evaluate personal
ethical obligations independently, guided by the code of ethics); Matalon, supra
note 3, at 571 (noting that the ethical rules merely suggest that a lawyer perform
pro bono services, but do not make the obligation mandatory). Matalon contended
that the lack of sanctions for failing to provide pro bono representation provided
no incentive for lawyers to fulfill their pro bono obligations. Id. at 572. No lawyer,
Matalon maintained, has ever been reprimanded for not performing pro bono services. Id. Cf Hunter, supra note 13, at 7 (refusing to accept a court appointment
"constitutes a direct criminal contempt of court, punishable by fine or jail sentence
or both"). See also J.W. Thomey, Annotation, Attorney's Refusal to Accept Appointment
to Defend Indigent, or to Proceed in such Defense, as Contempt, 36 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1971 &
Supp. 1991) (citing cases in which attorneys received penalties for refusing to serve
when appointed by the court).
163 Matalon, supra note 3, at 571. See also Hunter, supra note 13, at 8-9 (discussing
the vast differences in social and economic burdens between early and modern
American lawyers).
164 Cramton, supra note 149, at 1132. Alan M. Slobodin, President and General
Counsel of the Legal Studies Division of the Washington Legal Foundation, asserted: "Americans ... would rather have a legal profession that really wants to
help out of choice than one that does so out of coercive licensing requirements."
Slobodin, supra note 1, at 13. Regarding student pro bono, some students have
expressed the opinion that "requir[ing] public service is to denigrate it." Jane E.
Bahls, Doing Good Time, Should Pro Bono be Mandatory in Law School?, STUDENT LAWYER, Oct. 1992, at 15.
165 Smith, supra note 128, at 735; Spencer, supra note 1, at 497-98; Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1025-26; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 925. See also Barlow F.
Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
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granted only to those who meet rigid requirements. 66 As a result, the legal profession consists of highly educated and experienced individuals trained to negotiate the complexities of the
law. 167 Some commentators have suggested that without
mandatory pro bono, the government would be forced to furnish
legal services by non-lawyers 16 1 or
socialize the practice of law
69
through government regulation.

The competition for paying clients among the more than
800,000 registered attorneys in the United States weakens the
monopoly argument. 170 In addition, the deregulation of advertising and solicitation methods have fueled internal competition. 17 1 Barriers limiting non-lawyers' ability to offer legal
1, 15 (1981) ("the practice of law is a monopoly because it is limited to a select few
and because that limitation results in restraints upon the public's use of legal services").
Historically, an independent legal system has been considered essential to our
mode of government and to the preservation of individual rights. Smith, supra note
128, at 734-35. Thus, society has permitted lawyers to be "free and independent"
in the practice of law. Id. at 735. The monopoly resulted because the states regulated attorney licensing in an effort to ensure quality representation. Matalon, supra
note 3, at 557.
166 Cramton, supra note 149, at 1135; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 925. As Wechsler pointed out: "The combination of limited law school enrollments, bar examination and other licensing requirements, and strict enforcement of unauthorized
practice limitations together insure that lawyers hold a monopoly on the provision
of legal services, indeed on all access to the public justice system." Id. See also
Christensen, supra note 165, at 15 (asserting that the economic and educational
obstacles prevent many from becoming lawyers).
167 Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1025. The monopoly argument can be
extended even further in that, in addition to providing legal services, lawyers are
very influential in the political and economic arenas. Spencer, supra note 1, at 498.
168 Smith, supra note 128, at 735. See, e.g., Julie G. Shoop, Free-Lance Paralegals
Approved in New Jersey, TRIAL, Sept. 1992, at 105, 105-06 (discussing In re Opinion
No. 24 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, No. A-91 (N.J.
1992) in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that free-lance paralegals may
provide independent legal services in New Jersey).
169 See Shapiro, supra note 26, at 790. Shapiro warned that "[w]ith state funds, of
course, comes at least the threat of state control .... " Id. Shapiro also noted that
socialization of legal services had occurred in England and other Western European countries. Id.
170 Cramton, supra note 149, at 1135-36 (observing that "it is no longer accurate
to speak in terms of a professional monopoly. Growth in the number of lawyers, the
abandonment of restraints against internal competition . . . and changes in legal
culture have reduced or eliminated opportunities for cross-subsidization").
171 Id. at 1136. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479
(1988) (holding that a state could not prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business
for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients
known to face particular legal problems); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977) (declaring that a state could not bar an attorney from publishing in a newspaper truthful advertisements concerning the terms and availability of routine legal
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and almost any citizen can obtain a law

degree.

Implementation of a widespread pro bono requirement,
however, could improve the tarnished image of the legal profession.174 A mandatory pro bono requirement may also expose
lawyers to potential clients and financial benefits. 175 Moreover,
pro bono may foster an attorney's personal growth, instill a more
76
humanitarian attitude and provide valuable legal experience.
B.

Arguments Opposing Mandatory Pro Bono
The most vehement argument against mandatory pro bono
may best be articulated in the question: "Why lawyers?"' 177 Notably, no other profession is subject to similar requirements to perform free services. 178 The legal difficulties of the poor are only

services); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,414, 439 (1977) (deciding that nonprofit legal
organizations could solicit potential litigants through direct mail advertising for
political purposes only). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468
(1978) (prohibiting in-person solicitation by attorneys); In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448,
457, 599 A.2d 1265, 1269-70 (1992) (prohibiting direct solicitation of potential
clients who are vulnerable and unable to make reasoned judgments).
172 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 776. For example, alternative dispute resolution is
becoming an option for many who wish to avoid a costly lawsuit. Id. at 776-77. In
addition, a rise in the number of small claims courts and self-help books and manuals have made legal assistance more readily accessible. Id. at 776 & n.214. See also
Smith, supra note 128, at 735 (predicting that if lawyers are unwilling to provide
needed legal services, the public will be forced to permit encroachment into the
field by nonlawyers); see supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision that held free-lance paralegals were allowed to continue practicing).
173 Bretz, supra note 1, at 628. But cf. Matalon, supra note 3, at 558. Matalon
argued that there are formidable barriers to the pursuit of a legal career. Id. A legal
education is often well beyond the economic capabilities of most individuals. Id. In
addition, acquiring a license to practice law entails a rigorous academic training
process. Id.
174 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 925. See also Smith, supra note 128, at 736 (citation
omitted) (advising that a lawyer "has an affirmative duty to cleanse the bar of its
shysters, crooks, liars, incompetents, and laggards"). A May 1991 Gallup poll
asked Americans to rank 73 occupations according to honesty and integrity.
Slobodin, supra note 1, at 13. "That Americans ranked lawyers behind most occupations and only slightly ahead of prostitutes and Congressmen confirms an unfavorable public perception" due, in part, to "the tiresome litigation explosion." Id.
175 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 926. As one law professor stated: "Whenever clients who cannot pay get more legal services, clients who can pay need more legal
services." Humbach, supra note 156, at 566.
176 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 925-26.
177 Spencer, supra note 1, at 500; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 926.
178 Bretz, supra note 1, at 628. For example, pharmacists and doctors, who are
categorically no different than attorneys, are not required to fulfill a pro bono obligation. Hills, supra note 8, at 1006. Additionally, restaurants and grocery stores,
which are required by law to obtain an operating license, are not mandated to do-
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one part of a broad-based social problem, and lawyers should not
be singled out to provide the remedy.' 79 The answer to a social
problem is a social solution. 8 0 It is the public, therefore, who
should bear the expense of meeting the legal needs of the
poor. 181
Imposing a pro bono requirement to resolve the problem of
82
inadequate legal representation of the poor is ineffectual.
Mandatory service amounts to an "excise tax" on attorneys that
is not imposed on other professionals. 183 Moreover, even if
every lawyer were to satisfy a mandatory pro bono requirement,
the demand for legal representation of the poor would still not
be met.' 84 Requiring attorneys to provide pro bono services is
the equivalent of compelling
charity, and morals and generosity
185
cannot be legislated.
nate free food, and teachers must obtain teaching certificates but are not required
to donate their free time to teaching poor illiterates. Bretz, supra note 1, at 628. But
cf.Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1026 (asserting that while physical healing may
occur without doctors, justice under the law cannot be achieved without a lawyer:
"lawyers and the legal profession are as much a part of the problem as a part of the
solution").
179 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 926. Poverty entails not only insufficient legal services but inadequate housing, food, clothing, plumbing, entertainment and a variety
of life's basic necessities. Humbach, supra note 156, at 565.
180 Spencer, supra note 1, at 500.
181 Stevens, supra note 8, at 772. Similar to the costs of social security and welfare, the burden of meeting the legal needs of the poor "should be borne equitably
by all citizens." James N. Adler et al., Pro Bono Legal Services: The Objections and Alternatives to Mandatory Programs, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 24, 25 (1978).
182 See generally Humbach, supra note 156, at 565-66.
183 Id. at 566. See also Spencer, supra note 1,at 500. Professor Humbach also
contended that this tax would unfairly burden different types of attorneys within
the profession. Humbach, supra note 156, at 566. For example, sole practitioners
would have difficulty paying the tax because their only major source of income is
selling their own time. Id. Similarly, a government or corporate lawyer might have
to sacrifice a vacation to meet a pro bono requirement. Id. See also supra note 178
and accompanying text (discussing the unfairness of a mandatory public service
that is not imposed on other professionals).
Some critics have argued, however, that while a similar obligation is not placed
on other professionals, a mandatory pro bono requirement for lawyers will improve
the general plight of indigents. Tudzin, supra note 150, at 114, 145.
184 Humbach, supra note 156, at 564. Although the United States has more lawyers per capita than any other country, a 5% to 10% dedication of each attorney's
time to pro bono work would hardly put a dent in the need for legal services among
the poor. Id. See also Spencer, supra note 1, at 509 (conceding that a mandatory pro
bono requirement cannot satisfy the legal needs of the poor; full-time, staffed legal
services programs must still be a part of meeting those needs).
185 Tudzin, supra note 150, at 114; Adler et al., supra note 181, at 25. See also
Christopher Kilbourne, Pro Bono Service Makes Lawyers Feel Defenseless; Many Resent
Being Forced to Assist Needy Clients, THE RECORD, May 17, 1992, at Al, 15 (quoting
Seton Hall University Law School Dean Ronald J. Riccio's query: "How can you
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The constitutional arguments opposing mandatory pro bono
generally fall within five categories. 86 Court-appointed representation is almost always attacked as a taking of private property
for public use without compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 18 7 To constitute a taking, an attorforce someone to be charitable?"). But see Spencer, supra note 1, at 502 (arguing
that a mandatory pro bono requirement is not a method of compelling charity but
rather a regulation of the practice of law). Mandatory pro bono service, Spencer
argued, concerns a professional commitment by lawyers to guarantee the basic
rights of the entire population. Id.
186 Hills, supra note 8, at 1007-13.
187 Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 287. The takings argument is usually raised in
actions in which an attorney has sought fees for services rendered under court appointment. Stevens, supra note 8, at 779 & n.71. See, e.g., Madden v. Township of
Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 597, 601 A.2d 211, 214 (1992) (addressing attorney's request
for fees for court appointed assignment); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 402, 217 A.2d
441, 442 (1966) (same). Furthermore, most takings objections occur in actions
concerning gratuitous representation in civil suits, rather than criminal actions.
Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1020 (citations omitted). Several states have
recognized the validity of the takings argument where attorneys were forced to represent indigents without compensation. See, e.g., Pruett v. State, 574 So.2d 1342,
1356 (Miss. 1990); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 547 (W. Va. 1989); State ex
rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 836 (Kan. 1987); DeLisio v. Alaska Superior
Court, 740 P.2d 437, 442 (Alaska 1987); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d
314, 319 (W. Va. 1976). But see Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143, 147 (Ga.
Ct. App.) (not acknowledging the takings argument), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958
(1966); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 634 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1965); Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 600, 601 A.2d 211,
215 (1992) (same); Huskey v. State, 743 S.W.2d'609, 611 (Tenn. 1988) (same).
The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part: "Nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV. The Fifth Amendment just compensation requirement has been held applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
Although the Takings Clause seems to imply protection against an unconstitutional taking or regulation of "land" per se, takings challenges have been raised in
a wide range of circumstances. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles Part IA Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv.
1299, 1302 (1989). For cases addressing takings challenges involving property
other than land, see Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 214
(1986) (governmental regulation of employee pension funds); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984) (public use of private trade data); PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980) (public use of private shopping
center for purpose of political speeches); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 53-54
(1979) (regulation prohibiting commercial transactions of legally killed birds protected by The Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41 (1960) (government taking of materialman's liens);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946) (building airport near residential
land making it uninhabitable because of noise and pollution).
For cases involving takings challenges involving land or land use, see Nollan v.
California, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987) (beachfront land); Penn Central Transporta-
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ney's services must be considered protected "property' ' 8 8 the
taking of which requires just compensation. 89 Opponents of
mandatory pro bono assert that an attorney's services qualify as
"property" protected by the Fifth Amendment. 90 Moreover,
tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978) (regulation limiting development of historical landmark); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367
(1926) (zoning laws that prohibit industrialization in residential area); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 394-95 (1922) (regulation that prohibited mining
of coal without compensation); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 395 (1915)
(prohibition against operation of brickyard in residential neighborhood).
188 Bruce A. Green, Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 384 (1981). The
Supreme Court's definition of "property" has ranged from tangible, physical land
to intangible economic rights created by state or positive law, to economically
vested rights. Peterson, supra note 187, at 1308-16. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (declaring termination provision allowing state to withdraw from Social Security System not a
vested property right); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04 (interpreting the scope of
property to include a trade secret rights in health and safety data of pesticide manufacturer); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (holding that cable wiring was "permanent physical occupation" of small
strip of building and therefore a taking of property); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (deeming the historical landmark, Grand
Central Terminal in New York City, and its above airspace to be property); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381 (1945) (defining property as a
short-term lease on an apartment building or the rights inherent in a citizen's relationship to a physical thing).
189 Green, supra note 188, at 384. The Supreme Court has employed four different tests to determine if a governmental action constitutes a taking requiring just
compensation. Peterson, supra note 187, at 1316. For example, under the Penn Central test, the Court examines three factors: 1) the nature of the regulation, 2) the
investment backed expectations, and 3) the diminution in value. DAVID CRUMP ET.
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 393 (1989) (citing Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). As the test was stated in Agins
v. City of Tiburon, a zoning law constitutes a taking "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . .or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land ...." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)
(citations omitted). Third, the Court has identified the latter half of the Agins test to
constitute the "Economically Viable Use" test. Peterson, supra note 187, at 1330.
See, e.g.,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (holding ordinance prohibiting church from building on
flood plain did not deny owner economically viable use of land); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) (declaring statute regulating property uses not a taking unless it denied to owner economically
viable use of land); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 335 (1981) (concluding that
provisions of Surface Mining Act did not "deprive a property owner of economically beneficial use of his property"). Under the Loretto rule, the Supreme Court
established a per se taking rule: a permanent physical occupation of private property constitutes a taking that requires just compensation. Peterson, supra note 187,
at 1333 (citing Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,

434-35 (1982)).

190 Stevens, supra note 8, at 783. Because labor is an attorney's only marketable
product, the Supreme Court should protect the practice of law against unconstitu-
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forced representation constitutes a taking because it benefits the
public at the expense of a private individual.' 9 '
Supporters of mandatory pro bono assert, however, that enforcing an obligation already owed to the public cannot constitute a taking. 92 Supporters also believe that forced
representation does not interfere with a private property interest
because the state controls the practice of law."' Because lawyers
enjoy a monopoly on legal services,' 94 the pro-mandatory pro
bono faction asserts, they are expected to pay for that economic
95
advantage by representing indigents without compensation.
Mandatory pro bono has also been attacked as a denial of
tional impositions. Id. Although the Court has not determined if an attorney's services are "property," lower court decisions seem to imply that the "time, experience,
and skill of a professional ... [are] 'property' that is 'taken when services are compelled.' " Green, supra note 188, at 385 & n.143. See, e.g., Bedford v. Salt Lake City,
447 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1968) (finding that personal services are a form of property protected under the takings clause); cf. Konisberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252,
257-58 (1957) (stating that California's denial of a license to practice law based on
applicant's political affiliations would amount to a serious deprivation in light of the
time and expense of garnering a law school education); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 247 (1957) (enunciating that a state's refusal to allow attorney to take the bar exam because of his previous arrests and communist
party affiliations was a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
But cf. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973) (stating that testimony
provided at trial was not compensable property under the Takings Clause); Butler
v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (determining that compelled labor for maintenance and building of public roads was not property).
191 Stevens, supra note 8, at 783-84. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960) (declaring that the purpose of Just Compensation Clause was "to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
192 Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 288. See also United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d
633, 635 (1965) (concluding that attorneys have an obligation to serve indigents
without compensation); see supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing
the "officer of the court doctrine" and lawyer's professional responsibility argument that are typically used to rebut a takings challenge).
193 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 775. Shapiro noted, however, that in some circumstances, compensation to attorneys should be required. Id. at 774. As framed by
Shapiro: "An obligation to perform certain work, backed by the sanction of contempt, professional discipline, or loss of livelihood, is about as direct an invasion of
a person's control over his labor as can be imagined." Id. The purpose of a
mandatory pro bono requirement is to extract an affirmative public benefit rather
than prevent a harmful use. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978) (holding that a taking did not result because limiting development of a historical landmark yielded a public benefit).
194 See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing monopoly
argument).
195 Green, supra note 188, at 388. The flaw in the monopoly argument, of course,
is that many other professionals that are subject to state licensing requirements
(doctors, teachers, insurance agents, brokers) monopolize access to their services
but are not required to provide free services. Id.; Shapiro, supra note 26, at 775.
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equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 6 Forced
representation of indigents singles out attorneys from other comparable professions, and may even create an unfair distribution
of the burden within the legal profession itself.' 97 Strict scrutiny
196 Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 603, 601 A.2d 211, 217 (1992).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant
part: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Equal Protection
Clause is only found in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court guaranteed the same protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Patterns of Congruence, Divergence andJudicial Deference,
16 OHio N.U. L. REV. 591, 596 (1989) (citing Boling, 347 U.S. at 499).
Judicial review of an equal protection challenge entails examining both the
state's interest in the enacted law and the means used to serve that interest. Id. at
592-93. Depending on the nature of the right, the Supreme Court utilized three
different levels of review. Id. at 593. Under the lowest level of review, the law must
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. Rational basis review generally applies to areas of social welfare and economic rights. Id. See, e.g., United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (striking down provision
of Food Stamp Act that restricted participation in food stamp program to household members that are related); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 110 (1949) (upholding regulation that restricted advertising on trucks as a
safety precaution against distractions while driving).
Under an intermediate level of review, a law must have a substantial relation to
an important government interest. Doherty, supra, at 596 (citing Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Sometimes referred to as rational basis with a "bite,"
the intermediate level of review applies to classifications based on illegitimacy and
gender. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2024 (1972); Doherty, supra, at 595. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (holding that university policy of denying males admission was unconstitutional); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764-65, 776 (1977)
(striking down statute that restricted an illegitimate child's inheritance from his biological father); Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92, 210 (striking down statute that prohibited
sale of beer to men under 21 and women under 18 years of age); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 72-73, 77 (1971) (invalidating Idaho statute that preferred males to females as estate administrators). Under the highest level of review, the classification
must serve a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to meet the state's
objective. Doherty, supra, at 594-95. Strict scrutiny applies to classifications based
on race, alienage and national origin. Id. at 594.
197 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 770-71. For example, attorneys practicing in rural
areas may bear a heavier portion of the burden of indigent representation than
those employed in the city. Hunter, supra note 13, at 10. There are simply fewer
attorneys in small counties, and most metropolitan areas maintain a public defender office that can handle those cases. Id. Additionally, inequities in the distribution of indigent representation may occur because of the type of law an attorney
practices. Id. at 10-11. Attorneys who specialize in areas such as patent, corporate
or tax law will be called less frequently to represent indigents than those who maintain a general practice. Id.; Hills, supra note 8, at 1007. Finally, the burden usually
falls more heavily on young lawyers rather than on the older, more experienced
attorneys who are rarely called, except in cases in which highly competent representation is needed. Hunter, supra note 13, at 11. See also Lenvin, supra note 37, at
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does not apply because attorneys are not a suspect class,' 9 8 and
the ability to practice law is not a fundamental right.' 9 9
Mandatory pro bono, however, survives a rational basis analysis
because it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest protecting the welfare of the poor.20 0 In addition, professional
groups historically have been forced to comply with limitations
or regulatory constraints on the manner in which they ply their
trade.2 0 '
Forced representation can also be characterized as a violation of a lawyer's freedom of association under the First Amendment.20 2 Mandatory pro bono service forces the attorney to
379 (suggesting that appointment of a neophyte attorney may inhibit a defendant's
right to effective counsel).
198 Stevens, supra note 8, at 780. Suspect classifications are those based on race,
national origin and alienage. Id. at 780 n.66. See Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971) (asserting that "classifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect"); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216
(1984) (asserting that "discrimination based on alienage triggers strict scrutiny");
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (holding that exclusion of Mexicans
from juries was subject to strict scrutiny review).
199 Stevens, supra note 8, at 780. Strict scrutiny also applies to laws that infringe
upon an individual's fundamental rights. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 375, 390-91 (1978) (right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54
(1973) (right to an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 440, 441, 454-55 (1972) (right to use contraception); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 632 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (married couples' right to use contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (parental right to direct
upbringing and education of children).
200 See Stevens supra note 8, at 781 n.68 (noting that under rational basis review, a
classification must be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (upholding Maryland's restriction on
aid to families with dependent children as a means of encouraging individuals on
welfare to seek gainful employment); supra note 196 (discussing rational basis
review).
201 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 485-86, 491 (1955)
(preventing opticians from fitting eyeglasses without optometrist's or ophthalmologist's prescriptions); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 220-21,
225 (1949) (prohibiting life insurance companies and their agents from engaging in
the undertaking business); Semeler v. Oregon State Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.
608, 609, 612-13 (1935) (upholding the regulation of advertising by dentists).
202 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law ...

abridging the freedom of speech ....

" Id. The

free speech provision protects an individual's right to speak. Shapiro, supra note 26,
at 763. See also Kelly A. Hardy, Comment, Order in the Courtroom, Silence on the Courthouse Steps: Attorneys Muzzled by EthicalDisciplinary Rules, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 1401,
1406-14 & n. 19 (1992) (discussing the First Amendment's application to the judicial forum and the attorney's freedom of speech). The Supreme Court, however,
has also applied First Amendment protections to an individual's freedom to associ-
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support ideas or associate with causes to which the attorney may

be opposed. 20 ' First Amendment challenges, however, may depend on the specific nature of the pro bono commitment.20 4
Thus, a mandatory pro bono requirement that provides alternatives for fulfilling the20 5obligation, would eliminate any First
Amendment violation.
A pro bono requirement can potentially violate an individual's right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment.2

°6

ate with others and "to be free from coerced association with causes, ideas, and
conduct espoused or engaged in by others." Shapiro, supra note 26, at 763. See, e.g.,
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 717 (1977) (invalidating a New Hampshire
law that required noncommercial motor vehicles to bear the motto "Live Free or
Die" on their license plates); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419, 420, 437-38
(1963) (upholding the NAACP's right to refer a potential plaintiff in school desegregation cases to an attorney).
To withstand a constitutional challenge on the right to associate, the state must
have a compelling interest for imposing the regulation that cannot be achieved by a
less restrictive means. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (stating
that "state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny").
203 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 763. See also Cramton, supra note 149, at 1131 n.99
(asserting that challenging mandatory pro bono on First Amendment grounds is
premised on the notion that it "violates expressive autonomy").
204 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 763-64. For example, a tax imposed on attorneys to
fund indigent representation may embrace a "reform" that the attorney vehemently opposes even though it might be for a public service. Id. at 764-65. Even if
the obligation is defined as a narrow and meaningful service requirement, as opposed to a financial burden, it still might be antagonistic to the values of those who
are required to serve. Id. at 765. Thus, a lawyer assigned to represent a specific
individual should not be blamed for refusing to do so because of that lawyer's personal beliefs. Id. at 766. As Shapiro pointed out, "a lawyer is a person with a conscience," and despite the putative ability to separate his own beliefs from his role as
an advocate, a lawyer should not be disciplined for refusing to do so. Id.
205 Cramton, supra note 149, at 1131 & n.99.
206 Hills, supra note 8, at 1012 (citingJewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 542 (W.
Va. 1989)). See also Stevens, supra note 8, at 775 n.40 (citing cases in which the
court declared that compelled representation violates an individual's right to effective counsel). In United States v. Rubin, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the standard definition of the right to effective counsel as " 'not errorless counsel,
and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to
render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.' " United States v. Rubin, 433
F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Mackenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th
Cir. 1960)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971).
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Madden v. Township of Delran stated that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was only the right to effective counsel, "not to
the best counsel." Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 599, 601 A.2d 211,
215 (1992) (citing United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442, 444-45 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 945 (1971)). Additionally, the court noted that "the right to counsel does
not guarantee that all defendants will have exactly the same level of quality in their
representation." Id. See also Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 530 (Ala), appeal
dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979) (noting that there was not any significant disparity in
the quality of service between an appointed and retained attorney); State v. Rush,
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Uncompensated service substantially reduces a lawyer's motivation to represent clients zealously20 7 and, due to insufficient
funding, sometimes hinders an adequate investigation.20 8 More
importantly, many attorneys lack the experience to handle the
legal problems of indigents in areas of the law in which the attorneys are unfamiliar.2 0
Opponents to pro bono service have argued that compulsory
representation violates the Thirteenth Amendment. 210 A parallel
46 N.J. 399, 406, 217 A. 2d 441, 444 (1966) (concluding that assigned counsel are
no less qualified than privately retained counsel).
207 Hills, supra note 8, at 1012. For example, one study showed that 75% of the
defendants who had court-appointed counsel pled guilty while, during the same
period, only 20% of those who retained private counsel entered a guilty plea.
Hunter, supra note 13, at 8 & n.8 (citation omitted). See McLaughlin v. Royster, 346
F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Va. 1972) (attorney admitted that if he had been paid for
his representation he would have conducted the defense differently); In re Dale, 247
S.E.2d 246, 248 (1978) (attorney failed to file appeal following indigent's conviction because of financial considerations); In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1977)
(attorney refused to file appeal of client's death sentence unless compensated).
208 Hills, supra note 8, at 1012. Specifically, Hills referred to defense system studies and case law that demonstrated a correlation between the amount of money
expended for defense services and the quality of the representation received. Id.
(citing Kendrick, supra note 4, at 398-400).
209 See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing attorney's lack of experience or expertise in the legal problems of the poor).
210 Hills, supra note 8, at 1010; Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 290; Shapiro, supra
note 26, at 767-68; Stevens, supra note 8, at 784. The Thirteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1. Enacted in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery
in the United States. Catherine M. Page, Note, United States v. Kozminski- Involuntary Servitude-A Standard at Last, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1989). The movement to abolish slavery, however, dated back to the adoption of the Northwest
Ordinance in 1787 which the Thirteenth Amendment incorporated, Id. at 1024.
The Northwest Ordinance stated:
"There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
territory otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted; Provided always that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed
in any one of the original states, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."
Id. at 1024 n.4 (quoting Northwest Ordinance, Art. VI, 33 JOURNAL OF CONTINENTAL

CONGRESS 343 (1787)). Almost 75 years later, Congress adopted the Confiscation
Act of 1861, considered to be one of the first substantive acts prohibiting slavery.
GEORGE H. HOEMANN, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHT: THE EMBODIMENT OF FREEDOM
IN THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 28 (1987).

Under this Act, any slaves who were

used for insurrections were confiscated. Id. at 22. The following year, Congress
passed two other acts that "prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude in the District of Columbia and the territories." Page, supra, at 1024 & nn. 6,7 (citing Act of
June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 (1862) and Act of April 16, 1862, ch. 54 § 1).
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argument asserts that pro bono wrongfully compels the performance of charity.2 1' These arguments are generally the least persuasive for several reasons.21 2 Under the "public service
exception" the Supreme Court has mandated service to meet a
public need.21 3 Additionally, the real intent of the Thirteenth
Amendment was to abolish slavery and conditions of serfdom or
peonage.21 4 Because refusal to perform pro bono services does
After the Civil War, the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 rendered
the substance of these previous acts applicable throughout the United States. Id.
Another commentator contended that the goal of the Thirteenth Amendment
was not only to end slavery, but also to strive for a system of voluntary labor. Stevens, supra note 8, at 785. Thus, a mandatory pro bono requirement would be
unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment because it is a form of involuntary servitude. Id.
211 Spencer, supra note 1, at 501. Some argue, however, that because an individual is not forced to become an attorney, the constitutional objections to a
mandatory pro bono requirement lose some of their merit. Id.
212 Bretz, supra note 1, at 629; Hills, supra note 8, at 1010; Shapiro, supra note 26,
at 768. See also Bellacosa, supra note 1, at 753 ("The quibbling, nibbling and quarreling about volunteerism versus involuntary servitude and like rhetorical rantings
are silly, embarrassing and counterproductive, and should cease."). For a review of
decisions that have rejected Thirteenth Amendment challenges to a pro bono requirement, see Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir.
1984); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985); Sparks v. Parker,
368 So. 2d 528 (Ala.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979); State v. Rush, 46 N.J.
399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); State v. Clifton, 247 La. 495, 172 So. 2d 657 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
213 For cases in which the courts have mandated certain actions for the benefit of
the public good see Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 & n.ll (1973)
(requiring witness to testify); The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390
(1917) (deeming the military draft mandatory); Kasey v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d
369, 370 (9th Cir.) (requiring the preparation and filing of tax returns), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 869 (1972); United States v. Gidmark, 440 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir.) (ordering induction into military service), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 868 (1971); United States v.
Croeker, 420 F.2d 307, 309 (8th Cir.) (compelling military service under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1011 (1970); United States
v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir.) (holding that induction into military service
did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969). See
also United States v. Tivian Labs, 589 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1978) (collecting and
submitting data on toxic emissions), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); United States
v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir.) (conscientious objector must perform civilian labor), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) .
The test for voluntariness under the Thirteenth Amendment balances the duties imposed against on an individual against the public need for representation.
Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 291 (citing Bobilin v. Board of Educ., 403 F. Supp.
1095 (D. Hawaii 1975)).
214 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 768. Broader interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment have implied, however, that its provisions extend beyond the prohibition against slavery. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (stating that
"[t]he undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely
free and voluntary labor throughout the United States"); Bailey v. Alabama, 219
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not warrant imprisonment, the alleged involuntary servitude is
2 15
not equivalent to slavery and its consequences.
The last major argument opposing mandatory pro bono has
been classified as "functional objections. 2 1 6 Under this argument, critics assert that most lawyers lack the expertise or competence to handle the legal problems of the poor. 1 7 The focus on
billable hours in larger firms and the hectic pace of the sole practitioner pose significant time constraints on attorneys attempting
to meet pro bono requirements. 2 "8 Accordingly, forced repreU.S. 219, 241 (1911) (stating that involuntary servitude as used in Thirteenth
Amendment meant "control by which the personal service of one man is disposed
of or coerced for another's benefit"); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2nd
Cir. 1964) (declaring that the term "involuntary servitude" in the Thirteenth
Amendment extended beyond incidents of slavery). See generally Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 437 (1989)
(asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment encompassed the broad concept of employee autonomy and independence).
215 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 770; Stevens, supra note 8, at 785. But see Hunter,
supra note 13, at 7 (warning that a refusal to serve "constitutes a direct criminal
contempt of court, punishable by fine or jail sentence or both"); Comment, The
Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky.
LJ. 710, 717 (1972) (noting that an attorney who refuses to accept a court appointment risks a possible fine, imprisonment and loss of livelihood); In re Spann Contempt, 183 NJ. Super. 62, 65, 443 A.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that an
attorney's refusal to accept assignment in municipal court constituted criminal contempt); Schoolfield v. Darwin, 185 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tenn. 1945) (attorney's refusal to accept appointment constituted contempt); State v. Frankel, 119 NJ.
Super. 579, 581, 293 A.2d 196, 197 (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); State
ex rel. Supreme Court v. Anderson, 397 P.2d 838, 842 (1964) (en banc) (stating that
attorney's deliberate or intentional failure to pursue procedures necessary to appeal indigent's conviction warranted disciplinary action). For a discussion on the
circumstances under which a refusal to serve has or has not constituted contempt of
court, see Thomey, supra note 162, at 1221.
216 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 929.
217 Bretz, supra note 1, at 634; Humbach, supra note 156, at 566. The legal
problems of the poor may be complex, and mastering these problems cannot be
accomplished by handling random issues a few weeks every year. Humbach, supra
note 156, at 566. Requiring tax and securities lawyers to represent indigents would
be like, "unleashing the corporate bar on the poor," an objective that is undesirable to both groups. Spencer, supra note 1, at 510. Some have argued, however,
that the force of this argument is debatable. Id. With adequate training, even the
highly sophisticated bond-indenture attorney is capable of providing assistance to
the poor in some fashion. Id. (citing Thomas Erhlich, RationingJustice, 34 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 729, 744 (1979)). In
addition, the attorney's lack of experience lessens over time as the attorney handles
more cases involving public service problems. Id. at 511. But see Trebach, Modern
Defender, supra note 7, at 295 (maintaining that young attorneys upon whom the
burden usually falls are not assigned enough to gain experience); Lenvin, supra
note 37, at 379 (arguing that neophyte attorneys may inhibit a criminal's right to
effective counsel).
218 Bretz, supra note 1, at 634.
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sentation may sacrifice the quality of the representation 2 ' 9 and
lead to an increase in litigation.22 °
Mandatory pro bono programs have also been characterized
as inefficient 2 2' because they often lack focus,

2 22

involve little co-

ordination with local legal services 223 and only vaguely define the
types of service that satisfy the requirements.2 24 Enforcement of
the obligation is also difficult to monitor2 25 and entails enormous
administrative burdens.22 6 Moreover, in addition to reducing an
227
228 Finally,
attorney's
mandatory
pro bono
program
may havea
a "chillingincentive,
effect" on aother
voluntary
programs.
219 Adler et al., supra note 181, at 25. Not only does forced representation have
the potential to deprive an individual of the right to adequate representation, but
an incompetent defense could result in a malpractice action against the attorney.
Humbach, supra note 156, at 566; Hunter, supra note 13, at 7. See also Cramton,
supra note 149, at 1127 (declaring that "[c]ompelling lawyers to provide free legal
services may result in grudging and low quality service"); Slobodin, supra note 1, at
14 (quoting Supreme Court Justice O'Connor who stated that mandatory pro bono
could become a "recipe for malpractice"); Watkins, supra note 1, at 198 (warning
that mandatory pro bono would create situations in which attorneys would take
cases to meet pro bono requirements, but would not represent the indigent as zealously as paying clients); see also supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that forced uncompensated representation may violate an
indigent's right to effective counsel).
220 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 779; Rosenfeld, supra note 147, at 266-67. The
introduction of otherwise unavailable attorneys would encourage litigation in cases
where nonlitigation solutions would be more appropriate. Id. Others have argued,
however, that while court congestion and delay present a serious problem in the
judicial system, denying the poor access to that system may be considered "neither
an efficient nor justifiable solution." Spencer, supra note 1, at 511.
221 Graham, supra note 6, at 65.
222 Charles F. Palmer & Mark N. Aaronson, Placing Pro Bono Publico in the National
Legal Services Strategy, A.B.A.J. 851, 852 (Aug. 1980).
223 Id.
224 Bretz, supra note 1, at 633.
225 Adler et al., supra note 181, at 27. Proving that an attorney completed the
required number of service hours is among the difficulties of enforcement. Bretz,
supra note 1, at 634. Additionally, legal representation does not always fit into a
neat, specific unit of hours. Adler et al., supra note 181, at 27.
226 Bretz, supra note 1, at 633. Among the administrative tasks attendant to implementing a mandatory pro bono program are coordinating attorneys with clients,
monitoring the attorney's progress and staffing and funding the program. Id.
227 See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing an attorney's presumptive lack of enthusiasm when performing legal services without compensation).
228 Watkins, supra note 1, at 198-99 & n.107. According to one commentator,
however, there is little evidence to support the proposition that a mandatory pro
bono requirement would reduce the number of attorneys volunteering to provide
legal services. Graham, supra note 6, at 65. For example, the President of the Bronx
County Bar Association was unaware of any protest over the court-ordered
mandatory program established in 1986. Id. Nevertheless, the Bar President noted
that assignments to lawyer's outside their area of expertise would generate opposition. Id.
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mandatory pro bono rule may also provide the government with
an excuse to reduce funding for legal aid programs.229
VI.

MANDATORY PRO BONO: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Although arguments in favor of mandatory pro bono are, in
a certain sense, compelling, a mandatory obligation will not resolve the problems of indigent representation. 23 0 As seen in New
Jersey, several factors inhibit the success of a mandatory pro
bono program: insufficient funding, 23 ' inequitable implementation,2 3 2 and a shortage of voluntary programs. 33 A voluntary
pro bono program combining public funding and a renewed

commitment from attorneys would more effectively serve indigent litigants.23 4
Regardless of the system used, attorneys should be compensated for providing their services 235 and the public should bear
the burden of indigent representation. It is the public, after all,
who benefits from the availability of legal aid.23 6 Compensation
229 Watkins, supra note 1, at 199.
230 See Bretz, supra note 1, at 623, 638 (noting that mandatory pro bono is not the
most efficient answer to indigent legal representation).
231 See generally Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra note 7, at 862 (noting
that the NewJersey Legislature has failed to provide adequate funding for the office
of the public defender); Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 612, 601
A.2d 210, 221 (1992) (acknowledging the legislature's failure to fund § 2A:1585.2).
232 Committee Report on Court Appointments, supra note 7, at 859, 862. See also supra
note 96 and accompanying text (discussing inequities in appointing counsel in New
Jersey).
233 Rocco Cammarere, County BarAssociations: Few Provide Pro Bono Help, N.J. LAwYER, July 13, 1992, at 1012. Cammarere noted that only nine of the 23 counties in
New Jersey provided free legal services to the poor. Id. For example, the Monmouth County Bar Association administers its own legal aid program. Id. at 1019.
Similar programs have been instituted in Gloucester and Atlantic counties. Id. at
1012, 1017. Counties that have not employed a pro bono program include Sussex,
Warren, Salem and Essex. Id. at 1017.
234 Adler et al., supra note 181, at 24; Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at
307. See also Lichtman, supra note 16, at 4 (advocating a "mixed system" that would
combine and balance public and private power and financing).
235 Stevens, supra note 8, at 771.
236 Id. at 772. See also Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 594-95, 601
A.2d 211, 212 (1992) (conceding that until the legislature provides funding, the bar
must continue to bear the "burden of what is clearly an obligation of the public");
State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (en banc) (declaring that Missouri
lawyers, after Sept. 1, 1972, will no longer be compelled to "discharge alone 'a duty
which constitutionally is the burden of the State.' ") (quoting State v. Rush, 46 N.J.
399, 408, 217 A.2d 411, 448 (1966)); see also Rush, 46 N.J. at 412, 217 A.2d at 448
(maintaining that "the burden is more than the [legal] profession alone should
shoulder, and hence we are compelled to relieve the profession of it").
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produces a more willing, motivated and effective advocate.2 37
Compensating attorneys for pro bono work will therefore improve the fairness of the judicial system.238 The bar alone should
no longer be required to support indigent legal defense
programs.23 9
Compensating counsel for pro bono services, however,
raises funding problems. 240 Taxing attorneys' fees affords one
potential solution.24 ' A tax, however, faces constitutional objec237 Stevens, supra note 8, at 775. See also supra note 208 and accompanying text
(discussing correlation between compensation and adequacy of defense). In late
1988 and early 1989, Steven Wechsler, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Research and Library Services at the Syracuse University College of Law, conducted a survey of 200 attorneys located in New York and Florida. Wechsler, supra
note 3, at 931, 933. The purpose of this survey was to ascertain attorneys' attitudes
on mandatory pro bono programs. Id. The results of the survey indicated that most
attorneys were not strong supporters of mandatory pro bono. Id. at 948-49. The
primary reasons for the negative attitude toward mandatory pro bono programs
were their structure, administration and longevity. Id. at 950. In addition, many
attorneys noted that not only were pro bono clients ungrateful for the services that
were provided free of charge, but they often misrepresented their income and financial status to obtain free legal services. Id. at 958. As a result, Professor Wechsler recommended that some amount of payment would be of value to both parties.
Id.
238 Stevens, supra note 8, at 777. Stevens contended that uncompensated appointments deny indigents equal access to the judicial system because those who
cannot afford their own counsel usually stand at a severe disadvantage relative to
those who can. Id. Compensating appointed counsel, Stevens argued, would allow
an indigent to receive more effective representation and reduce some of the prejudice that indigents encounter in the judicial process. Id.
239 Madden, 126 N.J. 591, 595-96, 601 A.2d 210, 213. As Chief Justice Wilentz
stated: "We cannot forever accept a system so clearly inefficient, historically unfair,
and potentially unconstitutional." Id.
240 For cases illustrating the dilemma created when state legislatures authorize
compensation but fail to fund the pro bono programs they enact, see Madden v.
Township of Delran, 126 N.J. 591, 612, 601 A.2d 210, 221 (1992); State ex rel. Wolff
v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 415, 217
A.2d 441, 449 (1966). The legislature's failure to appropriate funds stems from
various factors including inflation, tax-cutting, public hostility against criminals and
a low political priority. Kendrick, supra note 4, at 412-13. Expenditures for indigent
defense services are 25% of that spent for prosecutorial services. Id. at 414. In
addition, absent statutory authority, courts are reluctant to order compensation.
Bretz, supra note 1, at 639. The Supreme Court's failure to provide the lower courts
with any guidance on this issue further aggravates the compensation problem. Kendrick, supra note 4, at 389 (advocating the need for Supreme Court standards on
the issue of compensation for court-appointed attorneys).
241 Kilbourne, supra note 185, at 15. At the 1992 New Jersey State Bar Association meeting in Atlantic City, Seton Hall University School of Law Professor and
former Third Circuit Court of Appeals ChiefJudgeJohnJ. Gibbons stated that "[a]
[one] percent tax on legal services would throw off an awful lot of dollars." Id. A
tax on lawyer's fees is a highly visible, efficient means to provide resources needed
for legal assistance to the poor. Cramton, supra note 149, at 1133-34.
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tions 24 2 and may favor successful practitioners .24' Alternatively,
a flat, cash contribution might provide needed funding 24 4 and allow attorneys to "buy out" their pro bono obligation.2 4 5 As an
added incentive, contributions could be tax-deductible for both
lawyers and non-lawyers.2 4 6
The Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) could
also provide an additional source of funding. 2 47 In an IOLTA
program, attorneys and law firms deposit "short-term client trust
funds" in an interest bearing account, 4 8 and the interest is paid
242 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 783. For example, singling out lawyers to subsidize
the costs of legal aid potentially violates the First Amendment by requiring lawyers
to support causes with which they might disagree. Id. at 763-64. See also Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 873 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (comparing the forced
payment of dues to a state bar association to a forced payment of dues to a union
organization and opining that such dues violate the First Amendment when the
payors are "compel[led] to support candidates, parties, ideologies or causes that
they are against"). This infringement of First Amendment freedoms cannot bejustified by the benefit received. See id. A tax on attorneys' fees to support indigent
representation may also unfairly burden a small sector of the population in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 878 (Douglas,J., dissenting) (implying that imposing an obligation on the legal profession but
not other professions such as doctors, nurses, and dentists violates constitutional
rights); see also supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in
opposition to a mandatory pro bono requirement as a potential violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
243 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 782 n.236. A solution to this problem would be to
tax lawyers' fees by a percentage or on a sliding scale to alleviate the potential
unfairness. Id. See also Cramton, supra note 149, at 1133.
244 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 781. Collected funds would support the Public Defender's Office or other legal service programs and compensate attorneys that perform pro bono work. Adler et al., supra note 181, at 26-27; Wechsler, supra note 3,
at 954.
245 Watkins, supra note 1, at 189 (citing Marrero Committee Report, supra note
128); Spencer, supra note 1, at 505-06. This Comment, however, does not propose
that cash payments substitute for pro bono work. Instead, attorneys who "buy out"
their obligation should at least be available for consultation and provide some administrative support to a voluntary program. See id. at 506. For a discussion on the
pros and cons of the "buy out" option see Greco & Miller, supra note 1, at 950-51.
246 Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7, at 320.
247 Cf Stevens, supra note 8, at 789. In 1990, IOLTA programs generated approximately $140 million, most of which was devoted to civil legal assistance.
Cramton, supra note 149, at 1137 n. 119. New Jersey currently employs an IOLTA
system. See N.J. CT. R. 1:28A-1 to - 5 (Pressler 1992). The New Jersey Supreme
Court recently amended the Court Rules, making participation in an IOLTA program mandatory for New Jersey Lawyers. Bruce H. Bergen, No Reason to Object To
Mandatory IOLTA, N.J. LAWYER, Sept. 28, 1992, at 1495; Supreme Court of New Jersey
Rules for Mandatory IOLTA, 132 N.J. L.J. 149, 198 (1992) [hereinafter Mandatory
IOLTA].
248 Stevens, supra note 8, at 789. Deposits should be voluntary to avoid invalidation under the Takings Clause. Under New Jersey's mandatory IOLTA plan, clients, entitled to interest, may still obtain interest on trust accounts through an
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to the state bar association to fund legal services programs.149
Public funding alone, however, will not resolve the inadequacies in legal aid to the poor.2"' An organized, comprehensive
and voluntary program would compliment a publicly-funded defender system. 25 ' An effective voluntary pro bono system must
match a client's needs with the attorney's services. 25 2 This pairing should create a system that links a volunteer with a indigent
client according to the client's needs and the attorney's skills and
capabilities.255 Other organizational tasks include defining the
scope of activities that qualify as pro bono service and establishing an administrative office for the program.254 This office, operating under the supervision of the public defender or
interest bearing account. Bergen, supra note 247, at 1495. The New Jersey IOLTA
program only applies to accounts that would not otherwise earn interest for the
depositor. Id. See also Mandatory IOLTA, supra note 247, at 198-99 for a review of the
amended provisions of Rule 1:28A.
249 Stevens, supra note 8, at 789. IOLTA programs instituted in New York and
California have shown to be very effective in generating income. Id.; Watkins, supra
note 1, at 181 n.21. In 1981, California enacted a statute that required the establishment of interest bearing accounts to pay attorneys who represented civil indigents. Stevens, supra note 8, at 789. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228
(Deering Supp. 1984). After five years, the mandatory IOLTA program raised 40
million dollars. Cramton, supra note 149, at 1137 n. 119 (quoting G. HAZARD, JR. &
S. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 565 (1990)). In 1991, the New
York IOLTA Fund awarded $13.5 million to 116 organizations in New York State
that provide civil legal assistance to the poor. Watkins, supra note 1, at 181 n.21
(citation omitted).
250 Bretz, supra note 1, at 638.
251 See generally Adler et al., supra note 181, at 24 (providing structured alternatives to a mandatory program).
252 Id. at 28.
253 Talent Bank, supra note 124, at 1736. In addition, the matching system should
consider "the economic impact on attorneys whose practice is dependent on representation of persons who might otherwise qualify for pro bono representation."
Adler et al., supra note 181, at 28. First the legal needs of the poor in each community must be determined. Palmer & Aaronson, supra note 217, at 852. A database of
every attorney practicing in New Jersey must then be established. Talent Bank, supra

note 124, at 1736. The database would include the location where the attorney is
practicing, general and specialized areas of practice, current and past pro bono
work and any other facts that would prove useful for matching a pro bono assignment. Palmer & Aaronson, supra note 222, at 852. Finally, a survey of existing legal
services programs throughout the state must be conducted. Id. This survey would
ascertain the number and quality of existing programs that could eventually serve
as a distribution center or referral service for voluntary pro bono assignments. Id.
254 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 951-52; Adler et al., supra note 181, at 28. For
example, the Marrero Committee, organized by New York Court of Appeals Chief
Judge Wachtler in 1988, proposed three categories of "qualifying" pro bono services as part of their mandatory pro bono program. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (defining qualifying activities under the Marrero Committee plan).
Under the Marrerro Committee plan, each of the proposed options involved some
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administrative office of the courts, could coordinate pro bono assignments, maintain an attorney database and monitor perform255
ance within each vicinage.
Continuous efforts to encourage participation must be implemented for an effective voluntary pro bono program. 56 The
establishment of a nonbinding voluntary service quota would define the amount of voluntary participation expected from each
attorney. 5 7 Additionally, each lawyer would be required to report the annual number of hours donated to pro bono work. 58
A voluntary quota with a mandatory reporting requirement
would create an incentive to participate because an attorney's efforts would be reviewed by the program administrator.259
Continuing education programs would alleviate the problems of inexperience by offering attorneys the opportunity to
learn about the areas of the law for which they are volunteering.26° Finally, monetary inducements such as fee-shifting artype of service to assist the poor. Marrero Committee Report, supra note 128, at 792,
793, 795.
The purpose of a narrow definition of pro bono is to ensure that legal aid is
provided to those who need it most-the poor. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 951.
Thus, representation on a local school or hospital board or umpiring a Little
League baseball game would not qualify as pro bono work. Id. at 914.
255 Adler et al., supra note 181, at 28; Madden v. Township of Delran, 126 N.J.
591, 606-07, 601 A.2d 210, 218-19 (1992) (outlining the responsibilities of the New
Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts and municipal judges). Additionally, the
administrative office would regulate compliance with the indigency standards, id. at
606, 601 A.2d at 218, and continuously evaluate its progress in meeting the legal
needs of the poor and make recommendations for improvement. Adler et al., supra
note 181, at 28.
256 Bretz, supra note 1, at 640.
257 Adler et al., supra note 181, at 28; Talent Bank, supra note 124, at 1736.
258 Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Florida's New Pro Bono Program, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1992, at 8. In February 1992, the Florida Supreme Court implemented a statewide
pro bono program in which every lawyer was expected to perform a minimum of 20
hours per year of pro bono services to the poor or pay $350.00 as a substitute for
providing services. Id. The program was not mandatory, and lawyers would not be
disciplined for failure to perform. Id. The program required, however, that each
lawyer report the number of hours contributed toward pro bono work at each annual membership renewal in the Florida Bar. Id. The reports were considered a
matter of public record as an account of the program's accomplishments and as a
reminder to all lawyers of their oaths. Id. The purpose of the reporting requirement was to use its accountability feature as a powerful incentive to perform pro
bono services. Id. See also Florida Goes Halfway in Pro Bono Program, NAT'L LJ., Mar.
9, 1992, at 6 (Florida Supreme Court endorses voluntary pro bono with a
mandatory reporting requirement).
259 D'Alemberte, supra note 258, at 8. A reporting requirement would also provide a means to ascertain the level of voluntary service among members of the bar.
Id.
260 Tudzin, supra note 150, at 117. See also Slobodin, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing
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rangements could be awarded for successful representation of a
pro bono client.2 6'
A pro bono requirement as a prerequisite for graduation
from law school would encourage volunteerism and instill an ethical obligation earlier in a lawyer's career.262 Mandatory pro
bono programs have been successfully instituted at several law
schools across the country, 263 and many others, including Seton
that values training would also be a more genuine solution for enhancing professionalism in areas of pro bono).
261 Cramton, supra note 149, at 1138. Under a fee-shifting arrangement, a defendant reimburses winning plaintiffs for attorney's fees and other litigation costs.
Id. The potential for the fee award could also encourage attorneys to perform pro
bono services. Id.
262 Cramton, supra note 149, at 1136-37; Trebach, Modern Defender, supra note 7,
at 323; Rosemary Harold, Stoking the Pro Bono Spirit, STUDENT LAWYER, Apr. 1991, at
14. See also Ken Myers, Students Try to Press the Issue of Mandatoy Pro Bono Work, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 4 (reporting on student efforts at several law schools to establish a mandatory pro bono requirement). The movement for a pro bono requirement in law school began at the Antioch School of Law In Washington, D.C., now
defunct. Id. at 164, at 17. At Antioch, students were required to spend six weeks
during orientation living in poor households and applying for food stamps. Id.
This requirement provided students with first hand knowledge of the need for free
legal services to the poor. Id. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor supported pro bono requirements for law students, stating that pro bono requirements
served the dual purpose of meeting the legal needs of the disenfranchised while
helping students to develop practical skills. Bahls, supra note 164, at 16-17 (citing
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's address at the ABA's 1991 Annual Meeting to the
Pro Bono Publico Awards Assembly Luncheon).
A second possible option might require attorneys to complete a public service
internship within the first two years of practice. Spencer, supra note 1, at 520. A
public service internship would not only provide young attorneys with invaluable
training and experience, but would instill an awareness of the legal needs of the
poor. Id. Three New York law firms currently have such a program in which firms
"loan" lawyers to a legal services office to work full-time for four months. WilliamJ.
Dean, Pro Bono Digest; Recent Leadership Conference, 205 N.Y. L.J. 3, 5 (May 21, 1991).
263 Anne Kornhauser, 'Public Service is Part of the Profession;' Mandatory Pro Bono
Sought for Law Schools, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 29, 1990, at 6. Among the schools that
have successfully implemented mandatory pro bono programs are Tulane University School of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Valparaiso University School of Law, Florida State University College of Law, the University of
Hawaii W.S. Richardson School of Law, the University of Louisville School of Law,
the University of Richmond T.C. Williams School of Law, Stetson University College of Law and the Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Bahls, supra
note 164, at 19. At Tulane University students must complete no more than 20
hours of pro bono service during their second and third years of law school. Pro
Bono Makes the Grade at Tulane, STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1988, at 7 [hereinafter Pro
Bono at Tulane]. Student assignments are coordinated with a referral attorney and
the pro bono project administrator, and typically involve legal research or interviewing witnesses, officials or other parties. Id. To support legal services efforts at
Tulane, the school also operates four legal advice clinics. Bahls, supra note 164, at
17. For example, one clinic, The Project for Older Prisoners (POPS), allows students to work with prisoners over age 55 who are seeking pardon or early parole.
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Hall University School of Law, have taken significant steps toSuch a requirement
ward implementing these programs.26
Id. At the University of Pennsylvania, students are expected to give 70 hours of pro
bono services. Allyson L. Moore, Seton Hall Considers Mandatory Pro Bono, 126 N.J.
L.J. 1589, 1614 (Dec. 13, 1990). Contrary to the program at Tulane, student assignments at the University of Pennsylvania include representing individual clients,
providing legal referrals in homeless shelters, drafting legislation and teaching
legal education courses. Id.
264 Moore, supra note 263, at 1589. For the last two decades, Seton Hall University School of Law has operated several legal clinics that serve over 3,000 people
annually in areas such as family law, juvenile representation and counseling, children's rights and housing advocacy. Id. at 1614. In addition, Seton Hall has a voluntary program in which students provide assistance to attorneys who are working
on pro bono cases. Id. at 1589. In November 1990, Seton Hall Law School received
a $5.3 million federal grant under the Labor, Health, Human Services and Education Appropriation Act. Id. at 1614. Enacted in late 1990, this Act appropriated
$15 million for projects such as the grant made to Seton Hall. Id. Seton Hall used
the funds to create a model clinical law center in Newark, New Jersey. Id. The new
Center for Social Justice is part of the school's new building that opened in 1991.
Id. The clinical education program now encompasses four areas of law: equal justice, affordable housing, family law and alternative dispute resolution. Id. The expanded program is expected to double the number of clients who receive assistance
and covers new areas such as disability law, child abuse and battered women cases.
Id. In addition, funds from the grant will be used to establish a social justice curriculum. Id. See also Bernard K. Freamon, A Blueprintfor a Centerfor SocialJustice, 22
SETON HALL L. REV. 1225, 1231-34 (1992) (discussing clinical legal education programs at Harvard University Law School, the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law of
Cleveland State University, the University of Wisconsin Law School, the University
of Maryland School of Law and City University of New York Law School).
To supplement the new program, Seton Hall has also contemplated the establishment of a mandatory pro bono requirement for all students. Moore, supra note
263, at 1614. As Seton Hall Law School Dean Ronald Riccio stated, "'The whole
concept behind the federal funding is to enable us to provide legal services to the
poor . . . . Whether we do it in a traditional clinical setting or through the creation
of mandatory pro bono program doesn't matter .
Id. (quoting Dean Ronald
Riccio).
Other student pro bono efforts include New York University's Pro Bono Students New York (P.B.S. NY). William S. Dean, Pro Bono Digest; Innovations in the Field
of Law; Pro Bono For Students, 207 N.Y. L.J. 3 (Jan. 27, 1992). Established in January,
1991, P.B.S. NY now operates in 13 of New York's 15 law schools. Id. Under the
program, each school has a P.B.S. NY counselor who assists students in choosing a
pro bono placement. Id. Students work on cases involving poverty law, immigration, civil rights, health, consumer law, disability and environmental law. Id. at 3-4.
Although there is no minimum hour requirement, "[s]tudents are encouraged to
perform at least 50 hours of pro bono work per year .
I..."
Id. at 29.
At Georgetown University, two pro bono programs are currently in place. Harold, supra note 262, at 14. The first is a volunteer resource center named "Georgetown Outreach." Id. This school-sponsored program provides student
volunteers to coordinate service projects such as soup kitchens and nonprofit legal
foundations. Id. The second program requires members of the GeorgetownJournalof
Legal Ethics to perform a minimum number of hours of pro bono work to remain in
good standing as a journal member. Id. at 15-16. Students generally provide service in areas such as immigration, housing, handicapped rights, consumer law, and
First and Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 17.
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would expose students to different areas of the law and would
help determine their post-graduation career interests,26 5 while
266
providing assistance to those needing it the most.

A successful voluntary program should encourage attorneys
in all branches of the practice of law to participate in pro bono
activities.267 Law firms and legal departments should establish
special committees to coordinate pro bono activities and act as a
liaison with state program administrators.268 In addition, work
performed on pro bono services should qualify for billable hours
quotas and be considered favorably in performance reviews.269
Lawyers should also be permitted to satisfy their pro bono assign2 70
ments collectively.

Finally, efforts should be made to reduce the need for pro
bono services altogether.2 7 ' For example, the expansion of alter-

native methods of dispute resolution would reduce the amount of
Dean, supra note 264, at 3.
266 Moore, supra note 263, at 1614. Even the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the value that law students contribute in meeting an indigent's legal
needs. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an important source of
legal representation for the indigent.").
Students have objected to a pro bono requirement because of its mandatory
nature. Kornhauser, supra note 263, at 3; Myers, supra note 262, at 4. Other
problems include procuring faculty support, organizing a program around difficult
student schedules, and obtaining resources to fund the programs. Jonathan
Fellner, Required Pro Bono Gets Schools'Mixed Reaction, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 1, 1991, at
BI. See also Bahls, supra note 164, at 16 (noting that at most schools, the administration rather than students vehemently opposed a mandatory pro bono requirement). Supporters of a student pro bono requirement have contended that pro
bono requirements are no different than taking a required course such as torts,
property or contracts. Kornhauser, supra note 263, at 3; Myers, supra note 262, at 4.
267 Bretz, supra note 1, at 640 (calling for participation from attorneys in both
large and small firms as well as corporate legal departments).
268 Dean, supra note 262, at 5.
269 Bretz, supra note 1, at 640; Dean, supra note 262, at 3.
270 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 954. Collective satisfaction would permit a firm to
satisfy the pro bono obligations of its attorneys as a whole rather than requiring
each lawyer to fulfill an individual duty. Torres & Stansky, supra note 1, at 1010.
The Marrero Committee also advocated a "group service option" that allowed
groups or firms with more than 10 lawyers to aggregate their pro bono activities.
Watkins, supra note 1, at 189-90. Sole practitioners were also permitted to informally congregate for the purpose of combining their pro bono requirements. Id. at
190. A collective satisfaction option has several advantages. Wechsler, supra note 3,
at 954. First, this method could alleviate the concern of some lawyers that they may
be unable to "buy out" of their obligation. Id. Second, allowance of collective fulfillment might "have a salutary effect on attorneys' attitudes toward mandatory programs." Wechsler, supra note 3, at 954.
271 Adler et al., supra note 181, at 28.
265

698

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:641

litigation. 7 2 Moreover, increasing access to small claims courts
would decrease the need for representation by an attorney.2 73
Additionally, some legal scholars have suggested that legal services programs could provide classroom instruction for pro se
litigants.2 7 4
VII.

CONCLUSION

Since Gideon v. Wainwright,27 5 both federal and state courts
throughout the United States have recognized an indigent's right
to counsel. Representation of indigent defendants in NewJersey,
however, has reached a crisis situation,2 76 and the legislature's
failure to fund the mandate of the Public Defender Act, a statute
272 Id. at 30.
273 Id.
274 Bretz,

supra note 1, at 638. Instruction of pro se litigants, of course, must be
limited to simple legal problems. Id. Also, the student-teacher relationship should
be kept on a professional level to insure that pro se litigants would not expect actual legal work or representation. Id.
275 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See supra note 4-5, 46-50 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Gideon.
276 On July 30, 1992, the Department of the Public Advocate announced that the
1992-93 budget of the Office of the Public Defender would be reduced by $1.9
million. Tom Hester, Wilentz Fears Shortage of Public Defenders; ChiefJustice Says Funding
Cuts Could Threaten 2,750 Prosecutions, THE NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Aug. 25, 1992, at
28. As a result, the Office of the Public Defender could not afford to pay attorneys
to act as defense counsel. Kilbourne, supra note 185, at 1. The use of "pool attorneys," hired by the public defender in cases in which a conflict of interest prohibited the public defender from representing multiple indigent defendants, had to be
discontinued by newly appointed Public Advocate, Zulima V. Farber. Marie Adrine,
PD Pool Attorneys Eliminated; Wilentz Warns of Crisis, N.J. LAWYER, Aug. 31, 1992, at 1,
6. The alternative to eliminating the use of pool attorneys would have been the lay
off of 100 public defender employees, including 40 lawyers. Id. at 6. In a letter,
dated August 24, 1992 to Jim Florio, Governor of NewJersey, and "legal, political
and bar leaders," Chief Justice Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme Court warned
that unless the legislature and legal community resolved the funding issue, county
governments would be ordered to pay the difference. Id. at 1, 6. An order to pay
"could mean a sixfold cost increase for taxpayers." Kilbourne, supra note 185, at 1.
See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 413, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (declaring that appropriate
compensation for assigned counsel would be "60% of the fee a client of ordinary
means would pay an attorney of modest financial success"). In the alternative, the
budget cuts threatened to force local prosecutors to drop the charges in almost
3,000 adult and juvenile criminal cases. Hester, supra, at 276; Adrine, supra, at 1.
Intervening in the "high-stakes game of chicken between the state Public Defender's Office and the Republican-controlled Legislature," Chief Justice Wilentz
issued an order to all trial judges who handle criminal and juvenile matters. Elliot
Pinsley, Wilentz Says Poor Defendants Must Be Given Lawyers, THE RECORD, (Oct. 2,
1992), at 12. Specifically, the Chief Justice ordered the judges to assign counsel
whenever constitutionally required and whenever counsel is not supplied by the
public defender. Id. Wilentz, however, did not reveal whether appointed attorneys
would be compensated. Id. The order was effective for 45 days or until November
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enacted almost eighteen years ago, is threatening to interfere
with this firmly established right. Moreover, although the Madden
court recognized the implications of forcing the private bar to
bear the burden of indigent representation, the New Jersey
Supreme Court failed to alleviate this injustice. In effect, the
court validated a mandatory pro bono requirement for attorneys
practicing in New Jersey.
The state and the bar must collectively meet the legal needs
of the poor. Although a lawyer has a professional obligation to
provide pro bono services, satisfaction of this duty should not be
forced without compensation. Forced representation benefits no
one and, ultimately, hurts the individual who needs it most. A
publicly-funded system in which attorneys are encouraged to participate voluntarily through both incentives and the pressure of
their conscience would most appropriately protect an indigent's
right to counsel.2 7 7

Kim Schimenti
13, 1992 to provide the legislature with ample time to develop an alternative solution. Id.
277 See Dean, supra note 262, at 3 (quoting ChiefJudge Wachtler of the New York
Court of Appeals who stated at the 1991 Pro Bono Leadership Conference that "a
lawyer who serves voluntarily at the side of the client does a better job for that
client.").

